POPULATION

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POPULATION PHENOMENA IN AMSTERDAM, IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER BIG TOWNS

By DR. J. H. VAN ZANTEN *and* T. VAN DEN BRINK

SINCE its foundation in 1894 the Municipal Bureau of Statistics in Amsterdam has composed every year, by means of statistical cards, very detailed statistics of the marriages contracted in the municipality, of the registered divorces, the notifications about birth and death, the establishment of non-Amsterdam people in this town, and the departure of Amsterdam inhabitants to other municipalities. These statistics throw a light on a number of phenomena, important from a cultural as well as from a social point of view. The results of these statistics are regularly published in Statistical Communications of the Bureau. The latest of these communications were No. 67, which appeared in 1923, and No. 97, which appeared in 1933. Communication No. 97 exclusively contained tables, but the Bureau judged it necessary to comment on the results of the research work in explanatory notes to the tables. This comment, which was written for the chapters "Marriage," "Divorce," and "Migration" by Mr. T. van den Brink, at present assistant director of the Bureau, and for the chapters "Birth" and "Mortality" by Dr. J. H. van Zanten, at that time Director of the Bureau, was not restricted altogether to a pure paraphrase of the figures, but it was possible to make a statistical study of the population phenomena referred to. Also attention has been drawn to the Dutch and foreign literature and statistical studies in this field. Thus the phenomena studied for Amsterdam have been compared with other data in the literature respecting other big towns.

In 1936 the Bureau published these studies in the Statistical Communication No. 103, but only in the Dutch language. As we were of opinion that many data and considerations might raise an interest outside the range of the Dutch language, we asked the editors of this Journal hospitality for publication in the English language of those parts of our study which are not merely of local importance. We wish to express here our gratitude for the kindness with which the editors enabled us to do so.

So the reader will find in the following pages the first chapter of our study, namely, "Marriage." In following instalments we hope to publish consecutively the chapters on "Divorce," "Birth," "General Mortality," "Infant Mortality," and some special causes of death (tuberculosis, cancer, and suicide). The chapter on "Migration" does not lend itself so well to translating; probably a separate article about this matter will appear in due course.

Originally we had hoped to compute in this article also the data for the later years which have become available since the edition of Statistical Communication No. 103, but we had to give up the idea, first of all on account of the labour involved, and further, the ratios, which were calculated for 1930, have probably not changed greatly during the last few years.

We further beg to draw the attention to the fact that our comments contain only the plain phenomena which we have found, but not an appreciation thereof. They have been worked out from a totally statistical point of view; in other words, we tried to represent the material as purely as possible, and to exclude as much as possible, by conversion, the elements which prevent a correct judgment. In some cases it appeared that it was impossible to perform this conversion without more material in figures. Nevertheless, in those cases we have indicated how the phenomenon could be approached in the right way; also as a stimulant to a further compilation of material. Only if this last condition is fulfilled we shall be able, in the long run, to obtain really exact comparisons, and this holds good especially if we want to give an international character to these comparisons and if we want to get acquainted with deviations between the home conditions and those in foreign countries.

"MARRIAGES"

During the last one hundred and twenty-five years the number of marriages contracted in Amsterdam has increased from 1,331 in the year 1811 to 6,837 in the year 1936. As in this period the population has also increased (from 200,000 to 780,000), we must study the mentioned marriage figures, and also the intermediate ones, in connection with the population in each period; either with the *total* population (marriage-rate) or, which is more exact, with the *marriageable* population (*nuptiality*), i.e. the unmarried (from 15 years and older[1]), widowers, widows, and divorced persons. As in a certain year it is not the whole marriageable population which marries, another ratio can be calculated, by examining for each year which part of the possible maximum has contracted a marriage. In the literature a few examples of such computation can be found.[1] Feld presumes that the average age at which bachelors marry varies from the twenty-fifth to the thirtieth year; the maximal number of marriages per annum is thus: 1/5 × the number of bachelors from 25 to 30, increased by a certain percentage for remarrying widowers and divorced men. However, the last-mentioned percentage, as well as the average marrying age, are fluctuating magnitudes; therefore one has to be sceptical about the importance of a rate calculated in this way.[2]

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[1] Where, further on, the marriage-frequency for males and females is calculated separately, an age-limit of 18 years for marriageable *males* and an age-limit of 15 years for marriageable *females* has been fixed, according to the method used in the publications of the Institut International de Statistique. By the calculation of the age of the marrying

The figures given below show the marriage-frequency in Amsterdam in the course of the last hundred years per 1,000 of the *total* population (*a*), as well as per 1,000 of the marriageable population (*b*).

ANNUAL AVERAGE OF CONTRACTED MARRIAGES

Period	(*a*) Per 1,000 of the Average Population	(*b*) Per 1,000 of the Marriageable Population of 15 Years and Over
1830–39	8·6	23·9
1840–49	8·5	22·8
1850–59	8·3	23·5
1860–69	8·4	23·7
1870–79	8·5	24·9
1880–89	7·6	23·3
1890–99	7·3	22·6
1900–09	7·7	23·9
1911–20	8·8	26·9
1921–30	9·1	28·1
1930–31	8·5	26·8

Both tables show that, notwithstanding the considerable

in connection with the religion to which they belong, the age-limit had to be fixed, for males as well as for females, at 20 years, as, from the total population in this regard, only a division of age-groups in decades is known.

[1] See Rümelin (v. Scheel), *Handbuch der politischen Oekonomie*, "Bevölkerungslehre," Tübingen, 1896, p. 844. Feld, *Die Züricher Heiraten, Statistik der Stadt Zürich*, No. 19, Zürich, 1916.

[2] See also Landsberg, "Zur Berechnung der Eheschliessungsziffer," *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique*, xxviii (1934), 2° livr., pp. 106 ff.

stability, yet periods of a higher or lower marriage-frequency succeed each other regularly.

Besides the changes in the frequency in the course of the years, there exist differences of marriage-rates in the same year in different towns. The annual average during the period 1926–30 per 1,000 inhabitants in Amsterdam and in a number of foreign towns of nearly the same size is shown in the following table. The data for calculating nuptiality for all these towns are lacking.[1]

ANNUAL AVERAGE OF MARRIAGES PER 1,000 INHABITANTS IN THE PERIOD 1926–30[2]

San Francisco	11·7	Bucarest	9·6	Birmingham	8·6
Cleveland	11·5	Brussels	9·5	Lyons	7·7
Budapest	10·7	Dresden	9·5	Milan	7·4
Prague	10·7	Copenhagen	9·3	Rome	6·9
Montevideo	10·7	Montreal	9·1	Sheffield	6·0
Stockholm	10·1	Warsaw	9·0	Naples	5·4
Hamburg	9·8	Leipsic	8·7		
Munich	9·8	**Amsterdam**	**8·6**		

Thus, in a number of towns the marriage-rate per 1,000 of the total population is higher, sometimes even considerably higher, than in Amsterdam. However, it has to be taken into consideration that the differences stated between the several

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[1] The fact that by calculating the marriage-rate per 1,000 marriageables (nuptiality) other mutual ratios arise, can be proved by studying the figures mentioned below, derived from Hersch, "Taux globaux et taux composites en démographie," *Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique*, ii, 1934, p. 7.

MARRYING FOR THE FIRST TIME, ANNUAL AVERAGE 1908–13

	Denmark	Switzerland	France	Germany	Italy
(a) Per 1,000 *inhabitants*	14·6	14·6	15·8	15·6	15·4
(b) Per 1,000 *marriageables*	51·3	42·9	53·9	56·9	57·4

The figures for Denmark and Switzerland need no explanation. For France, Germany, and Italy the order becomes inverse, if one compares the figures per 1,000 marriageables instead of those per 1,000 inhabitants.

[2] For some towns 1926–29.

municipalities, and also those for one and the same municipality in the course of years, apart from a changing attitude to marriage, might be caused by an unequal composition of the population.

Namely, a difference of the *age-distribution* is important, as from younger age-groups a greater number are inclined to marry than from older age-groups. Deviating composition of the population as to *civil conditions* is also of importance, as, according to the increase of the number of divorces, the number of persons considered for remarriage increases too, while, on the other hand, due to the more favourable death-rate, widowers and widows come in this position at a higher age, and consequently remarriage in this group decreases. Further, a bigger or smaller *surplus of women* and an unequal composition of the population, as to *social position*, influence the frequency-rates. All these factors, of which the importance will be discussed later on, may be causes of differences in marriage-*frequency*, without there being in reality a question of a different, respectively modified marriage-*intensity*.

If one studies the marriage-frequency in Amsterdam during the last hundred years, basing oneself upon the *yearly* frequency-rates instead of ten-yearly ratios, as has been done here above, it appears that rather considerable differences exist between consecutive years. A modified composition of the population cannot be the cause here, and these modifications have to be attributed to real differences in the desire of the population to marry, and, in the very first place, as a consequence of the economic circumstances.

The relation between marriage and the economic situation has been a subject of study for many investigators. Süszmilch[1] and Montesquieu[2] devoted themselves to the study of this subject, and in the nineteenth century several authors have tried to lay down this relation, on the basis of elaborate statistical material; in the beginning mainly by demonstrating the connection between the course of marriage-frequency and the prices of corn.[3] Low corn prices showed an abundance of victuals, high prices were a symptom of dearth. World trade, however, in the course of time, has changed this situation, and opened the possibility of meeting the needs in districts afflicted by crop failures. Besides, continually progressing industrialization has led to large classes of the population being no longer dependent upon the proceeds of the agrarian production. Moreover, other foods[1] occupy an important place, next to bread, and with an improvement of the standard of living the expenditure on food was forming a smaller factor in the budget. Further, in the course of the last century the level of corn prices has become more and more dependent on other factors than merely on the size of corn production. In periods of rising general business conditions, corn prices, even without there being question of crop failures, show nowadays also a tendency to rise, and we see the reverse in times of depression. Although the relation of marriage-frequency with the economic situation maintained itself, the contrast with corn prices, as it existed in the first half of the last century, has totally disappeared, and consequently, for the later years, one has tried to establish this correlation in another way.[2]

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[1] Süszmilch, *Göttliche Ordnung*, Berlin, 1775, § 223.

[2] Montesquieu, *Esprit des lois*, livre xxiii, ch. x.

[3] A. O. Weisz, "Die Ehefrequenz in ihrer Abhängigkeit von den Getreidepreisen," *Stat. Monatsschrift*, v, Wien, 1879, p. 513; v. Scheel, "Einflusz der Fruchtpreise auf die Bevölkerungsbewegung," *Jahrb. für Nat. Oek. und Stat.*, Bd. 6 (1866), p. 161.

In order to trace to what extent this relation exists in the

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[1] Engel, for instance, tried to find a relation between marriage-frequency and the price of potatoes ("Bewegung der Bevölkerung im Kgr. Sachsen," *Statist. Mitt.*, ii, Dresden, 1862).

[2] Ogle ("On Marriage-rates and Marriage-ages," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1890, p. 253, and Hooker ("On the Correlation of the Marriage-rate with Foreign Trade," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1901, p. 485) based their investigations on the extent of the foreign trade. Juglar ("Influence des crises commerciales sur l'état économique," *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, 1896, p. 247) already put the question in a more general way in comparing the marriage-frequency with the fluctuations of the economic crises. As long as we have not succeeded in the domain of Semiology to give an idea of this fluctuation in economic life by *one* total index-number (Sorer, "Uber die Bewegung von Korrelationskoeffizienten zwischen den Symptomen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Oesterreich," *Allg. Stat. Archiv*, Bd. 8 (1915), p. 195) we are bound to follow the course of the separate factors. Tönnies ("Die Gesetzmässigkeit in der Bewegung der Bevölkerung," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Bd. 39 (1915), pp. 150 and 767, one of the last published detailed studies on this matter) compares the course of marriage-frequency consecutively with different data, such as the rye prices, the value of "Bergwerks- und Hütte-erzeugnisse" (production of mines and blast-furnaces), imports and exports, revenues of the railway companies, postage revenue, total amount of drafts circulating, and others. Worth mentioning is also the article of Theodore Szel, "Influence des conditions économiques sur le mouvement de la population," *Journal de la Société hongroise de Statistique*, 1933, p. 302, and *Marriage and Divorce*, 1930, United States Bureau of the Census, Ninth Annual Report, Washington, 1932.

Netherlands, and especially in Amsterdam, a number of correlation coefficients have been calculated between marriage-frequency and the wheat and rye prices, the discount of the Netherlands Bank, the contango, and the extent (quantity) of imports and exports. They are computed for the years 1830–70 and 1870–1914 (1890–1914); however, as to the contango and the exports and imports, only for the last-mentioned period, because the data concerning the first period were not completely available.

The correlation is calculated according to the method which Hooker (see note 2 last page) applied in an analogous calculation for England. For each series the "trend-value" is calculated for every year, by means of nine-year moving averages. Thereupon in every series for every year the differences between the original numbers and these trend-values are worked out, and in the usual way the correlation coefficients are calculated between the new series of *trend-differences*. These coefficients are as follows.

CORRELATION-COEFFICIENTS OF THE MARRIAGE-FREQUENCY PER YEAR PER 1,000 INHABITANTS*

	Amsterdam			The Whole Country		
	1830–70	1870–1914	1890–1914	1830–70	1870–1914	1890–1914
Wheat prices ..	− 0·69	+ 0·10	—	− 0·74	− 0·06	—
Rye prices ..	− 0·65	+ 0·12	—	− 0·78	− 0·15	—
Discount of the Netherlands Bank	− 0·33	+ 0·39 (+ 0·44)	+ 0·47 (+ 0·54)	− 0·38	+ 0·34	+ 0·70
Contango	—	+ 0·54 (+ 0·55)	+ 0·71 (+ 0·72)	—	+ 0·43	+ 0·80
Imports and Exports	—	+ 0·30	—	—	+ 0·21	—

* In brackets the correlation with the marriage-frequency of males marrying for the first time.

The graph shows the series of trend-differences themselves, namely, those for marriage-rates and wheat prices in the period 1830–70, and for marriage-rates and discounts of the Netherlands Bank in the period 1870–1914.

It is evident from these figures that in the beginning, and in the middle of the last century also, in Amsterdam, and more especially in our country as a whole, a rather important negative correlation existed between marriage-frequency and corn prices, a fact which corresponds with the facts stated elsewhere. After 1870 the correlation, though positive, is not of notable extent, and it is impossible to talk of a closer relation. Before 1870 the marriage-frequency shows a negative correlation also with the discount, which is explicable, as formerly the standard of the interest rate, like the standard of the corn prices, was dependent on other factors than it is nowadays. Gradually a more direct relation has risen between the interest level and the general economic situation. For the period 1870–1914 the correlation is in consequence positive, and for the years after 1890, when this connection had become closer, still more positive. This positive correlation is still higher with the more susceptible contango.

After 1870 a positive correlation exists also with the extent of imports and exports per head of the average population. However, it is remarkable that Hooker[1] had found for the period 1861–95 a much higher correlation with the business cycles (+ 0·86) for England, while Ogburn and Thomas[2] conclude for the period 1870–1920 (without 1918) to the same figure (+ 0·87) for the United States.



This may be the consequence of the different economic structure in these countries compared with that in the Netherlands. In decidedly agrarian or industrial countries the fluctuations in the marriage-frequency will assume bigger proportions than in countries where this structure is of a less one-sided character, as in the Netherlands, where agriculture, industry, trade, and transport form, side by side, important means of existence of the population. The general prosperity-level can also be of influence. Just as increasing prosperity renders *in the course of the years* marrying more independent of the economic situation, so this factor can at the same moment raise *local* differences. Conditions which grow more unfavourable will exert in a place where the population lives just on the limit of minimal existence a checking influence on marriage, but not in a place where the rate of wages allows of a certain retrenchment without striking immediately the supply of the first necessaries of life. Seen in this light, the lower correlation figures for our country might point to a more favourable prosperity-level.

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[1] See note 2, p. 8.

[2] Ogburn and Thomas, "Influence of Business Cycles on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, xviii (1922), p. 324.

In the above-mentioned table the figures in brackets, for men marrying for the *first* time, are somewhat higher than those for all the marrying together. This was to be expected. In the case of those who marry for the first time the point is to establish a new family, while with those who remarry very often only the continuation of an existing family is involved. Between the frequency-rates of *re*marrying men and the contango, the correlation coefficient for the period after 1870 comes only to 0·07, and here there is no question of any relation.

The above-mentioned correlation rates for the second period run till the outbreak of the Great War. Leaving out the war years and those following immediately afterwards, one is again entitled to accredit the decrease of nuptiality in the middle of the period 1920–30 and the increase at the end of this period to the economic situation and to impute declining marriage-frequency in the years 1931 and 1932 (respectively 8·2 per 1,000 and 7·9 per 1,000 against 8·9 per 1,000 in 1930) to the development of the great crisis, which had its beginning in 1930. The year 1933 shows an increase to 8·6 per 1,000, at which level this figure remained also in 1934 and in 1935. Although for 1933 a symptom of economic revival may probably be seen in this rate, one will have to take into consideration a certain degree of *adaptation* to the situation in long periods of depression.

Next to factors of *economic* character, *wars* and *rumours of wars* also influence the marriage-frequency. War calls to arms first of all the young men of *marriageable* age, and a great number of them die. In this way many marriages are delayed or they do not take place at all, and this fact manifests itself in a low marriage-rate. The Great War of 1914–18 has in the first place left its impression on the intensity of marriage in the belligerent countries. But here, too, in different ways. This appears clearly

MARRIAGES CONTRACTED IN A NUMBER OF DUTCH AND FOREIGN TOWNS IN THE YEARS 1911 TO 1926 INCLUDED, IN % OF THE ANNUAL AVERAGE IN THIS PERIOD.



from the graph on this page. The curves for the German towns show a character entirely different from those of the (at that time) Austro-Hungarian, the Italian, or the English towns. Accidental factors may be of influence here. Thus the higher marriage-frequency in England in 1915 is assigned to the regulation that married persons did not need to mobilize.[1] The lower marriage-rates in the neutral countries are without any doubt connected with the state of mobilization, and this holds good especially for countries like the Netherlands, where this mobilization was maintained practically to the same extent during the whole period of war. In towns more distant from the battlefields, such as Copenhagen and Stockholm, no decline of the marriage-frequency in the war years can be traced.

After the war a rapid rise of nuptiality can be found everywhere. Marriages postponed by the war take place and war-widows remarry. In the Netherlands, too, where the last-mentioned cause was of no influence, the marriage-frequency nevertheless mounted to a level never reached before.

A third group of causes can, in case of sufficient extent, influence the current of marriage-frequency, namely, *illness* and *mortality*. Thus, in the period 1846–49 (high grippe mortality and cholera epidemic), 1855 (violent measles epidemic), 1871 (small-pox), 1875 (grippe and influenza), and 1918 (severe grippe year and high tuberculosis mortality) the marriage-frequency proves to have been lower, from time to time even considerably lower, than in the years around. It is not quite certain whether this phenomenon has to be entirely assigned to the last-mentioned cause; other factors may have been acting simultaneously in the same direction. For instance, the years 1846 and 1847 were also years of potato disease and dearth of food, and in 1918, the last war-year, people lived under heavy economic pressure, and in that year food supply caused more and more difficulties, whereas, next to this and partly also in consequence thereof, grippe and tuberculosis had many victims.

As a last group, finally must be mentioned the *measures* by which the *Government* tries to influence the marriage-frequency. As examples can be quoted here Italy, and of a more recent date Germany, where attempts are made to promote marriage as much as possible by awarding premiums and by marriage loans.

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[1] Prinzing, "Die Bevölkerungsbewegung in den neutralen europaïschen Staaten seit Kriegsausbruch," *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, 1919, p. 24. He demonstrates an analogous phenomenon in France after the return of Napoleon from Russia. The measures taken for a new completion of the army brought a "Flucht vor der Wehrpflicht in die Ehe" (escaping army service by marrying), and the marriage-rate rose from 7·5 in 1812 to 13·2 in 1813.

Civil Condition of the Marrying; Remarriage

Of the marriages contracted in Amsterdam since the year 1811, apart from a few intervals, the civil conditions of those marrying are known. For women, however, before 1900 no division between widows and divorced women was available.

The percentages of the years before 1870 do not give rise to many comments. Of those marrying, males and females respectively, rather more than 80 per cent and 90 per cent have never been married before. The remainder are remarrying widowers and widows. Remarriage of divorced persons still hardly occurs.

CIVIL CONDITION PER 100 IN EVERY PERIOD MARRYING

(*Percentage*)

Period	Males			Females		
	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced	Spinsters	Widows	Divorced
1811–20	82·1	17·7	0·2	89·7	10·9	
1821–26	85·4	14·2	0·4	91·0	9·1	
1850–59	81·1	18·4	0·5	90·0	10·0	
1860–69	80·8	18·5	0·7	89·4	10·6	
1870–79	82·8	16·5	0·7	90·5	9·5	
1880–89	87·1	12·0	0·9	91·9	8·1	
1890–99	87·4	11·0	1·6	92·1	7·9	
1905–09	88·5	8·9	2·6	92·4	5·4	2·2
1911–20	88·0	8·3	3·7	92·2	4·5	3·2
1921–30	86·3	8·0	5·7	91·0	3·9	5·1
1930	86·1	7·1	6·8	90·2	3·7	6·1

After 1870 the number of *unmarried*, especially among the males, is somewhat more emphasized, mainly as a consequence of the smaller amount of *widowers* and *widows*. This phenomenon lasts till the beginning of this century, after which the percentages for the *divorced* increase regularly, and even to such an extent that, in spite of the continual decrease of the widowers and widows, the percentages for unmarried also regularly decrease.

The fact that the number of the divorced gradually occupies a bigger place among those marrying appears also when the civil condition of the marrying males and females is considered in mutual relation.

An ever-increasing number of bachelors marry divorced women. Among the widowers, too, although they occur less frequently as a group among the marrying, the marriages with divorced women show a considerable increase. Among the spinsters and the widows the percentage of those who marry divorced men increases too.

(*Percentage*)

Period	Bachelors with			Widowers with		
	Spinsters	Widows	Divorced Females	Spinsters	Widows	Divorced Females
1905–09	96·1	2·4	1·5	62·0	31·4	6·6
1926–30	95·2	1·3	**3·5**	59·9	26·8	**13·3**

Period	Spinsters with			Widows with		
	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced Males	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced Males
1905–09	92·0	5·9	2·1	41·6	53·9	4·5
1926–30	90·2	5·2	**4·6**	29·7	55·7	**14·6**

The changes in the above figures are, among others, a result of the altered mutual ratios between single persons, widowed persons, and divorced persons among the *total marriageable population*, which appears from the analysis of the following table.

(*Percentage*)

	Males			Females	
	1879	1930		1879	1930
Bachelors (18 years and over) ..	86·3	84·5	Spinsters (15 years and over) ..	76·8	78·7
Widowers ..	13·4	12·0	Widows	22·8	17·9
Divorced males ..	0·3	3·5	Divorced females	0·4	3·4
Total	100	100	Total	100	100

In the last fifty years, in consequence of the more favourable mortality rates already mentioned, the percentage of widowers and widows has gone back; that of divorced men and women, in consequence of the regularly increasing number of divorces, has increased. For this reason, already fewer widowers and widows and more divorced persons than formerly will figure among the marrying at present.

The alterations, however, may also be the consequence of an altered marriage-frequency in every one of these groups. In order to trace this, the number is calculated in the table below of those who marry annually in every civil condition among the population present at the time of the census.

SPECIFIC MARRIAGE RATES*

(*Percentage*)

	1888–91	1898–01	1908–11	1919–22	1930–31
Males					
Bachelors of 15 years and over	52·9	56·9	55·0	67·4	59·6
Bachelors of 18 years and over	68·7	74·4	71·5	85·0	75·2
Widowers	60·3	60·8	50·6	68·2	47·1
Divorced	140·5	149·6	127·2	211·7	148·5
Females					
Spinsters of 15 years and over	44·3	48·3	47·9	64·3	54·8
Widows	12·8	12·4	11·2	14·4	9·6
Divorced	53·1	61·6	74·3	106·9	87·0

The course of these figures in the consecutive periods (as, for instance, the high frequency for 1919–22) is naturally related to the course of marriage-frequency in general, which has been discussed above. This fact explains also the fluctuations in the frequency rates for the single population. The scaling down of the marriage-frequency, on the other hand (which appears clearly in the rates), for widowers and widows can be safely considered as an actual change, as a real decrease, which is also quite explicable. The more favourable mortality ratios have involved not only a relative reduction of the total number, but also a modification in the age distribution of widowers and widows. Whereas in 1879 respectively 21 and 19 per cent of them were younger than 50, in other words in age-groups where there is, generally speaking, a certain possibility of marriage, in 1930 both percentages had come down to 14.

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* These figures are not completely exact. They are based on the persons married in Amsterdam; and in the marriages contracted in this town males and females not living in Amsterdam have also been involved. An investigation for the year 1932 has proved, however, that this last group, as to their number as well as the civil condition, shows very little deviation from the Amsterdam people who marry outside Amsterdam, so that it can be presumed that the preceding figures approximate reality pretty well.

As to the divorced, the rising marriage-frequency among females is especially noticeable. The attitude towards the divorced woman and her remarriage, which has been modified in the course of years, is expressed in these figures. The fact that the divorced show, moreover, the highest marriage-frequency, herein notably surpassing the unmarried, and especiallythe bachelors, is probably, among other reasons, to be connected with the fact that it is the desire to conclude a new marriage which has been in many cases the motive for divorce. Moreover, for the several civil conditions the age-distribution is of great importance in regard to the differences in marriage-frequency, as will appear afterwards.

A relatively smaller number of unmarried among the marrying means an increase of the number of *remarrying* persons.

If we presume with Feld[1] that the average of remarrying persons during a number of years gives an idea of remarrying in general, we are entitled, basing ourselves on the figures for the period 1926–30, to conclude for Amsterdam as follows:

In this period 31,629 marriages were contracted between 27,157 bachelors, 28,669 spinsters, and 7,432 remarrying persons.

This means that in that period, for the contracting of 1,000 marriages, $\frac{27{,}157 + 28{,}669}{31{,}629} \times 1{,}000 = 1{,}765$ persons, namely, $\frac{27{,}157}{31{,}629} \times 1{,}000 = 859$ males and $\frac{28{,}669}{31{,}629} \times 1{,}000 = 906$ females, are sufficient.

The number of males is lower than that of females, as men remarry more frequently. Thus, based on the data of 1926–30, 1,000 males contract $\frac{31{,}629}{27{,}157} \times 1{,}000 = 1{,}165$ marriages in their lives; 1,000 females, on the other hand, contract only $\frac{31{,}629}{28{,}669} \times 1{,}000 = 1{,}103$ marriages.

If remarrying among males and females took place to the same extent, 1,000 spinsters and 165 remarrying women would come into account for these 1,165 marriages of 1,000 men. In reality these figures are 1,056 and 109, from which appears once more in a somewhat different way the preference of a remarrying man for a spinster.

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[1] Feld, "Die Züzticher Heiraten," *Statistik der Stadt Zürich*, No. 19, Zürich, 1916.

On the basis of the records for the period 1905–09 dealt with in the same way, in that period 1,810 persons were necessary for 1,000 marriages, whereas the number of first and following marriages of 1,000 males and 1,000 females respectively scaled down to 1,130 and 1,082, which fact, in comparison with the above figures for 1926–30 (1,165 and 1,103), points to an increase of remarriage during the last twenty years. However, this does not mean that the same person nowadays contracts more marriages than formerly. This is demonstrated by the following figures for remarrying males and females.

REMARRYING IN THE PERIOD

(*Percentage*)

	1906–10			1926–30		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Second marriage ..	90·1	91·9	90·8	90·8	92·2	91·4
Third marriage ..	9·1	7·6	8·5	8·6	7·4	8·1
Fourth marriage ..	0·8	0·5	0·7	0·6	0·4	0·5
Fifth marriage ..	0·04	—	0·02	0·02	—	0·01
Sixth marriage ..	—	—	—	0·02	—	0·01
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

In 1906–10, 90·8 per cent of the remarrying contracted a second marriage, and 9·2 per cent their third or fourth marriage. For 1926–30 and 1932–33 the first-mentioned rates were 91·4 and 91·6, i.e. somewhat higher. In analysing the figures more closely, it appears that third and further marriages occur more among remarrying men than among remarrying women.[1]

For the years 1932 and 1933 a special division is also made for persons in widowhood and divorced persons. The differences are not considerable, but, nevertheless, divorced people seem more inclined to marry for the third or the fourth time than widowers and widows, which phenomenon could perhaps be explained by the fact that, in general, they are taken from a lower age-group.

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[1] The Netherlands Department of Statistics has previously worked out an analogous computation for the whole country. Of the remarrying males and females in 1918, respectively 95 and 96 per cent did so for the first time. For Amsterdam the equivalent rates were in that year respectively 91 and 95.

REMARRYING IN THE YEARS 1932 and 1933

(*Percentage*)

	Divorced		Widowers	Widows	Together		
	Males	Females			Males	Females	Total
Second marriage ..	90·5	89·3	92·3	93·0	91·4	91·8	91·6
Third marriage ..	9·2	10·0	7·1	6·4	8·1	7·5	7·9
Fourth marriage ..	0·3	0·5	0·3	0·6	0·3	0·6	0·4
Fifth marriage ..	—	0·2	0·3	—	0·2	0·1	0·1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

For the remarrying in 1933, the *lapse* of time has also been investigated between the *dissolution* of the last marriage, either by death or by divorce, and the *contracting of the new one* (see p. 20).

In this regard there is a considerable difference between men and women, which is connected with one of the regulations of the Code of Civil Law, namely, that a woman is not allowed to contract a new marriage within three hundred days after the dissolution of her last marriage. Of the remarrying males, 30 per cent did so within the space of one year after the termination of the last matrimony; for females this percentage is 16.

Examining a period of two years after the dissolution of the last marriage, one comes to the percentages of 48 and 40 respectively, and in that case the difference between both sexes is notably smaller.

There exists in this respect also a divergence between the remarrying whose marriage has been dissolved by decease and the divorced remarrying. Among remarrying widowers and divorced men the percentages of those who remarry within a year are 24 and 36 respectively. By examining the period of two years, the percentages, respectively 46 and 49, diverge much less. The divergence between widows and divorced women remarrying within a year is much bigger; the percentages are respectively 5 and 21. This difference still exists when we consider an interval of two years, as before, for males (28 per cent against 44 per cent). This, and also the higher rates for the group five years and longer (41 per cent against 23 per cent for divorced females), point to the fact that, whereas in the case of *widowers* compared with *divorced* men the difference consists of a shift from the first to the second year after the last marriage, in the case of *widows* the average space of time since the last marriage is actually longer than in that of remarrying *divorced* women. This phenomenon, in its turn, is probably connected with the fact that the divorce in most cases has been the consequence of the planned new marriage.[1]

REMARRYING IN 1933 ACCORDING TO LAPSE OF TIME SINCE DISSOLUTION OF THE LAST MARRIAGE

(*Percentage*)

Lapse of Time	Males		
	Widowers	Divorced	All
Under 1 year	24·5	36·0	30·2
1–2 years	21·9	13·2	17·6
2–3 years	16·7	14·6	15·6
3–5 years	16·5	15·9	16·2
5 years and longer	20·4	20·3	20·4
Total..	100	100	100

Lapse of Time	Females		
	Widows	Divorced	All
Under 1 year	4·9	20·6	16·0
1–2 years	23·1	23·8	23·6
2–3 years	15·4	13·2	13·8
3–5 years	15·4	19·0	17·9
5 years and longer	41·2	23·4	28·7
Total..	100	100	100

The preceding figures give the lapse of time since the dissolution of the last marriage, without any reference to the fact whether the remarrying do so for the first time, or whether they

[1] The statistical Annuary of Hamburg makes an analogous division from which, for the year 1929, the figures mentioned below are quoted.

have been married once or more times before. This division follows here for the persons remarried in 1933.

(*Percentage*)

LAPSE OF TIME SINCE DISSOLUTION LAST MATRIMONY OF—

Lapse of Time.	Remarrying Males who now Contract their —		Remarrying Females who now Contract their—	
	Second Marriage	Third or Following Marriage	Second Marriage	Third or Following Marriage
Under 1 year	28·7	43·9	15·7	18·8
1–2 years	17·7	16·5	23·0	31·2
2–3 years	16·3	9·9	13·6	16·7
3–5 years	16·5	13·2	18·4	12·5
5 years and longer ..	20·8	16·5	29·3	20·8
Total	100	100	100	100

The analysis of these figures shows clearly that males as well as females who still conclude to a third or following marriage do this sooner after the dissolution of their last marriage than those who have decided to contract their second marriage. From another division, not quoted here, it further appears that this is applicable to widowers and widows, as well as to divorced males and females.

In order to compare the civil conditions of the marrying in Amsterdam with the other aggregate Dutch towns of above 100,000 inhabitants and with those of 5,000 inhabitants or less, the following figures are given (see p. 22).

Note continued from p. 20

(*Percentage*)

Space of Time since the End of Last Marriage	Remarrying			
	Widowers	Divorced Males	Widows	Divorced Females
Under 1 year	19·3	34·8	4·6	22·5
1–5 years	62·0	45·1	45·4	52·9
5 years and longer ..	18·7	20·1	50·0	24·6
Total	100	100	100	100

These figures show that new marriages in Hamburg are not so soon contracted as in Amsterdam.

The figures of the first half of the table speak for themselves. For the rural municipalities the percentages for divorced people are very low. This is not astonishing, considering the fact that these communes, accounting for 21 per cent of the total population, contain 6 per cent of the divorced males and females, against the towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, accounting for 27 per cent of the total population, which contain no less than 66 per cent of the total number of divorced persons of both sexes in the Netherlands.

(*Percentage*)

	CIVIL CONDITIONS			MARRYING PERSONS IN 1930–31 PER 1,000 OF BOTH SEXES AND EACH CIVIL CONDITION		
	Amsterdam 1926–30 I	Municipalities above 100,000 Inhabitants 1931 II	Municipalities less than 5,000 Inhabitants 1931 III	Amsterdam IV	Municipalities above 100,000 Inhabitants V	Municipalities less than 5,000 Inhabitants VI
			Males			
Bachelors ..	85·9	86·5	93·6	75·2	74·0	54·8
Widowers ..	7·8	6·9	5·7	47·1	43·2	22·0
Divorced ..	6·3	6·6	0·7	148·5	149·6	93·6
Total ..	100	100	100	74·4	72·8	50·6
			Females			
Spinsters ..	90·7	90·7	96·9	54·8	51·5	57·2
Widows ..	3·7	3·3	2·5	9·6	8·7	6·9
Divorced ..	5·6	6·0	0·6	87·0	85·2	69·1
Total ..	100	100	100	47·8	45·1	48·4

The frequency-rates in the last three columns, also those for the same civil condition, diverge rather considerably. The difference in social situation and in local habits is undoubtedly of influence; it is, however, impossible to trace to what extent. The age-distribution will also be of importance; this factor cannot be neglected.

In the towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants, among the unmarried males aged 18 years and over 77 per cent are under 30 years. The corresponding number for the small communes with less than 5,000 inhabitants is only 69 per cent. Also, among those to be taken into account for remarriage, the younger age-groups are relatively less represented in the small communes; 11 per cent of the widowers and 51 per cent of the divorced males were under 50 years, against respectively 14 and 63 per cent in the municipalities of over 100,000 inhabitants.

It is further noteworthy that, whereas in the *small* communes the total marriage-frequency among both sexes, as well as among the unmarried, diverges but little, in the *big* towns these differences are considerable. The explanation can be found, amongst others, in the important surplus of women in big towns. The frequency-rates are computed per 1,000 marriageable males and females of respectively 18 and 15 years and over. In these age-groups in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants there are 393,000 women against 243,000 men (1,618 women per 1,000 men); in the communes with less than 5,000 inhabitants, on the contrary, there are only 247,000 women against 229,000 men (1,079 females per 1,000 males). As the total marriage possibility is determined by the sex the smallest in number, consequently by the number of marriageable men, in the big towns the important surplus of females leads to a frequency-rate notably lower among women than among men (45 against 73 per 1,000), whereas in rural areas the frequency-rate for males and females is nearly the same (48 against 51 per 1,000). Also the relation between the frequency figures among *unmarried* males and females (in the big cities for males and females respectively 74 and 51 per 1,000, and in the small communes 55 and 57 per 1,000 respectively) is connected with the surplus of women. The numbers of spinsters (15 years and older) and bachelors (18 years and older) were in 1930 in the big towns respectively 313,000 and 207,000, against 203,000 and 198,000 respectively in the rural areas. It is true that an unmarried person does not always marry an unmarried, but these marriages form, nevertheless, the great majority of all the contracted marriages (= 80 per cent). The fact that not always men and women from the same municipality marry each other has no preponderating influence on the preceding figures.

A few figures for foreign towns follow, for which a percentual division of the marrying males and females may suffice.

In most of the towns the percentages for remarrying divorced men and women are higher than in Amsterdam. So far as the males are concerned, Stockholm, Warsaw, and Rome form an exception, for females also Frankfort. The rates for remarrying widowers and widows also are higher in most of the foreign countries. The consequence is that Amsterdam returns rather high percentages for unmarried persons in comparison with the other towns. The same holds good for marriages where *both* partners have never been married before.

Definite conclusions on the basis of these ratios should be avoided. The real differences can only be approximated if the influence of the unequal composition of the total population as to age, civil condition, surplus of women, etc., can be eliminated.

CIVIL CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE MARRYING IN AMSTERDAM AND IN A NUMBER OF FOREIGN TOWNS DURING THE PERIOD 1926–30

Towns	Per 100 Marrying Males			Per 100 Marrying Females			Bachelor-Spinster Marriages per cent of all Marriages
	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced	Spinsters	Widows	Divorced	
Hamburg	81·4	8·1	10·5	86·3	4·7	9·0	75
Warsaw (1928–30)	89·9	8·2	1·9	93·2	5·2	1·6	86
Budapest	79·0	9·9	11·1	84·3	6·8	8·9	71
Rome (1928–30)	92·8	7·2	—	95·1	4·9	—	90
Amsterdam	**85·9**	**7·8**	**6·3**	**90·7**	**3·7**	**5·6**	**82**
Bucarest	85·9	5·9	8·2	89·4	4·3	6·3	80
Leipzig (1926–28)	81·1	9·4	9·5	88·6	4·4	7·0	76
Dresden (1926–29)	82·5	8·9	8·6	90·2	3·8	6·0	78
Copenhagen	81·9	7·0	11·1	88·6	3·1	8·3	76
Lyons (1927–30)	82·6	10·6	6·9	85·3	8·3	6·4	76
Frankfort	84·4	8·1	7·5	91·3	3·4	5·3	80
Stockholm	88·5	5·3	6·2	93·7	2·2	4·1	85
Zürich	83·4	6·6	10·0	88·4	3·8	7·8	78
Basel	85·8	7·5	6·7	90·3	3·8	5·9	81

Age of the Marrying

From the earliest times of the population statistics onwards the age of the marrying has attracted attention, and in dividing these marrying persons into age-groups one has tried to express the current opinion about early or late marriage.

Wappäus[1] discriminates "vorzeitige" (up to 21 years), "frühzeitige" (21–25), "rechtzeitige" (26–35), "nachzeitige" (36–45), and "verspätete" (46 and over) marriages. Von Mayr[1] was of the opinion that a difference had to be made between males and females, and he considered a division into three groups ("frühzeitige" = males under 25, females under 21; "normale" = males 25–40, females 20–30; "verspätete" = males 40 and over, females 30 and over) sufficient. But he is of opinion that: "diese verschiedenen Etiketten haben nur eine nebensächliche Bedeutung" ("These several headings are subordinate").

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[1] Wappäus, *Allgemeine Bevölkerungsstatistik*, ii, Leipzig, 1861. See also Horn, *Bevölkerungswissenschaftliche Studien aus Belgien*. i, Leipzig, 1854, pp. 175 ff.

And, indeed, with good reason. The tenor of such conceptions is not the same everywhere; it is connected with climatic and biological conditions and with local customs and habits, and, besides, it changes in the course of time.

In Amsterdam, too, the age-rates of the marrying have changed considerably since the middle of the last century, and in a different way for males and females.

AGE DISTRIBUTION IN EVERY PERIOD OF 100 MARRYING

Period	Males (Years)					Females (Years)			
	Under 24	25–29	30–34	35–49	50 and Over	Under 24	25–29	30–49	50 and Over
1850–59	21·1	73·5			5·4	28·8	68·8		2·4
1860–69	23·0	71·1			5·9	32·1	65·4		2·5
1870–75	28·0	65·8			6·2	39·2	58·1		2·7
1895–99	36·4	59·1			4·5	50·1	47·8		2·1
1900–09	36·3	33·5	13·3	12·6	4·3	50·5	27·0	20·4	2·1
1911–20	34·6	35·7	13·7	11·7	4·3	51·3	27·2	19·3	2·2
1921–30	30·7	38·1	14·3	12·2	4·7	50·6	27·3	19·5	2·6

From these figures it is evident that, although the data for a number of years are missing, among the marrying males as well as the females the youngest age-group (up to 24 years) proportionately has increased regularly in the second half of the last century.

After 1900 the importance of this group decreases for men, the age-group 25–29 coming more to the front and the group 30–34 showing equally a slight increase. Among marrying females practically no alteration can be stated. Rather more than 50 per cent of them are younger than 25.

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[1] Von Mayr, *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre*, Tübingen, 1926, Bevölkerungsstatistik, p. 697, note No. 1.

Investigating the relation between the *marrying* and the *marriageable* population, we see indeed that in the latter half of the last century marriage among young people has considerably increased. For marriageable males (18–24) the marriage-frequency was 33 per 1,000 in 1855–64, 44 per 1,000 in 1865–74, and 53 per 1,000 in 1895–1904. For females (15–24) the frequency-rates during these periods mounted respectively from 29 per 1,000 to 37 per 1,000 and up to 44 per 1,000. For the Netherlands as a whole an analogous movement can be demonstrated.

ANNUAL AVERAGE OF MARRYING MALES AND FEMALES OF EVERY AGE-GROUP PER 1,000 PERSONS OF BOTH SEXES

	Males		Females	
	1850–59	1890–99	1850–59	1890–99
Under 21 years* ..	27·0	41·0	33·1	44·0
21–24 years ..	108·8	137·1	111·5	124·5

* Males, 18–21; females, 15–21.

This increase of marriage at a young age can be considered *for the whole country*, among other things, as being the consequence of the progressing industrial development and the coherent formation of great groups of labourers, mainly concentrated in the big towns. These workmen are in many ways also, as to marriage, more independent and more self-assertive than the rural population. In *Amsterdam*, where in 1899 as well as in 1849 about 70 per cent of the professional population were working in industry, trade, and traffic, the altered *social* composition was, above all, of great influence. Parallel with the increase of great industries, the relation of independent workers to employees changed. The last group increased comparatively much more, and it is just this group (as will appear later on) in which early marriages especially take place. We are further entitled to presume that the general economic progress and prosperity, which for Amsterdam started after 1870, has also been of influence.

However, after 1900 the percentage of men under 25 among the marrying males declined, whereas that of the group 25–29 increased. This increase, however, is partly the consequence of the fact that the last-mentioned age-group has augmented more than the other (from 1899 to 1930 with 80 per cent, against a rise of 55 per cent and 65 per cent respectively of the marrriageable males (*a*) younger than 25 and (*b*) of 30 years and older.

From the following *frequency*-rates per 1,000 *marriageables* in *every age-group* still another cause of the increase is evident. The marriage-*intensity*, too, has augmented in this group.

Apart from the high frequency-rates in the years 1919–22, we see after 1900 among men under 25 a gradually smaller number who marry, among those of 25–29 a bigger one, whereas for the older age-groups no alteration of importance can be observed. It is difficult to explain why during the last thirty years men marry at a rather higher age. Perhaps the conditions of life for the young have become somewhat more difficult. It is also possible that the gradually growing needs as to habitation and furnishings influence delay of marriage.

PER 1,000 MARRIAGEABLE MALES AND FEMALES IN EVERY AGE-GROUP MARRIED

	Males				Females			
	1898–1901	1908–11	1919–22	1930–31	1898–1901	1908–11	1919–22	1930–31
Under 21* ..	16·3	14·1	13·7	10·8	19·9	19·8	28·4	24·3
21–24 ..	92·2	84·0	91·5	76·8	93·4	97·5	124·4	111·6
25–29	147·5	150·8	177·9	169·8	99·4	103·7	139·9	121·6
30–39 ..	117·5	113·8	145·6	121·8	57·1	54·8	72·1	56·8
40–49 ..	70·9	59·9	83·6	69·5	26·6	22·8	31·2	26·0
50 and over	21·6	19·4	25·2	23·1	3·6	4·0	5·7	5·5
Total ..	73·4	69·8	85·4	74·4	41·0	41·1	55·8	47·8

* Males, 18–21; females, 15–21.

For females the aspect is slightly different. Comparison of the frequency numbers of 1899 and 1930 shows that among females under 25 and from 25–29 the intensity of marriage is now substantially greater than at the beginning of this century. Still, we are not yet allowed to presume on the ground of these data that females marry at a gradually lower age. For it appeared clearly from the table on page 25 that since 1900 the age-distribution among *marrying* females has practically not changed. These high frequency-rates have another factor: they are the consequence of a modified age-distribution of the *marriageable* females, and at the same time of the mutation of the surplus of females, in total, as well as in the separate age-groups, as appears from the following figures.

	1899 Marriageable			1930 Marriageable		
	Males	Females	Females per 1,000 Males	Males	Females	Females per 1,000 Males
20–29 years ..	26,012	30,192	1,161	43,420	42,061	969
30–39 years ..	6,892	11,028	1,600	10,383	15,814	1,523
40–49 years ..	3,618	7,342	2,029	5,758	11,728	2,037
20–49 years ..	36,522	48,562	1,330	59,461	69,603	1,170

As the total marriage-frequency of males did not change (in 1899 and in 1933 respectively 73 and 74 per 1,000 marriageable males of 18 years and over), the diminution of the total female surplus has influenced the increase of the marriage-frequency of females from 41 to 48 per 1,000 marriageable females of 15 years and older.

The analysis of the preceding figures further demonstrates that the decrease of the surplus already mentioned affects principally the group 20–29, for which group the surplus has been converted into a deficit. And where more than 90 per cent of the marrying men under 30 marry a woman younger than 30, it is impossible to deny that it has been this decreased surplus of women which has caused the increase of the marriage-frequency of females in this group. This increase of the frequency-rates does not imply that females marry at an earlier age, but it points to a greater chance of marrying for the marriageable women of this age-group.

Moreover, it may be added that, in the second half of last century, the surplus of females has practically maintained itself, and hence that this factor has *not* influenced the increase of marriage-frequency among young females, stated also for this period.

For the years since 1927 the *average age* of marrying males and females has been computed.

The stability of these figures is remarkable. Nevertheless, a careful use must be made of these averages. At the utmost they may serve for a general orientation, as, for instance, by computing the age at marriage for different civil conditions.[1]

AVERAGE AGE (IN YEARS) OF THE MALES AND FEMALES MARRYING IN THE YEAR

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
Bachelors	26·8	26·9	26·9	26·9	26·9	27·1
Spinsters	25·8	25·1	25·2	25·2	25·1	25·0
Widowers	48·7	48·7	48·7	48·2	49·2	48·6
Widows	45·7	46·2	46·4	45·1	47·7	45·1
Divorced males ..	38·5	39·0	38·7	39·6	39·9	38·6
Divorced females ..	36·0	36·0	35·7	35·2	36·4	35·5
All males	29·4	29·3	29·4	29·3	29·6	29·6
All females	27·0	26·6	26·5	26·5	26·6	26·4

They do not give an insight into the age-*combination* of persons marrying. For this purpose the following figures are given, for the period 1926–30; the total number of marriages contracted in this period has been taken as 1,000.

The age-combination occurring most frequently is the one where the husband is 25–29 and the wife 21–24. In the period 1926–30 this combination presented itself in 166 out of every 1,000 marriages. In 1921–25 this rate was lower, namely 157; in

AGE (MALE)	AGE (FEMALE)						
	Under 21	21–24	25–29	30–39	40–49	50 Years and Over	Total
Under 21..	22·5	7·5	1·3	0·3	0·03	—	31·7
21–24 ..	83·7	142·1	42·3	5·8	0·1	0·03	274·1
25–29 ..	36·9	**165·7**	146·6	33·0	1·2	0·03	383·4
30–39 ..	7·8	40·7	70·8	69·7	8·5	0·6	198·1
40–49 ..	0·6	2·9	8·1	28·4	17·9	3·6	61·5
50 and over	0·1	0·4	1·7	8·2	17·5	23·4	51·2
Total ..	151·6	359·3	270·8	145·4	45·2	27·7	1,000

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[1] For the year 1932 in Berlin the mean age at marriage for males and females was respectively 31·7 and 27·5. In Zürich, too, the figures during the period 1928–32, respectively 30·0 and 27·8, and for the persons marrying for the first time, respectively 27·8 and 26·4, are higher than those for Amsterdam.

the periods 1900–09 and 1911–20 still lower, respectively 136 and 146. In those periods it was the combination where husband and wife were both from 21–24 years old which occurred most frequently (respectively 165 and 158 per 1,000 marriages). These numbers, too, demonstrate a higher marrying age of males in the course of the last decades.

Returning to the period 1926–30, we see that nearly half of the marriages took place between males and females of 21–30, and out of 1,000 contracted marriages 139 were recorded where one of the partners was minor, and 22 where both partners were minors. As the marrying age for men has gradually become higher, the last-mentioned combination formerly occurred somewhat more often (in 1900–09 in 29 of every 1,000 contracted marriages). For the purely Jewish marriages this rate is somewhat higher than for the rest of the marriages, namely, 29 per 1,000 during the period 1926–30.[1]

An annual average of 130 marriages (21 per 1,000) were contracted in this period where either the husband or the wife were older than 60, and among these in 40 cases *both* partners had reached this age.

The increasing marrying age of men, where for women this rate practically remained the same, also expresses itself in a relative increase of the number of marriages where the *husband is older* than the wife.

PER 100 CONTRACTED MARRIAGES

	1900–09	1926–30
Husband in higher age-group	45·4	51·0
Husband and wife in same age-group	38·0	37·0
Husband in lower age-group	16·6	12·0
Total	100	100

As this computation is made for *age-groups*, the actual rate of marriages where the husband is older is higher. Hence an investigation for 1932 returned only 17 per cent of all marriages where husband and wife *differed less than one year in age*, 16 per cent marriages where the husband was one year or more *younger*, and no less than 67 per cent where he was one year or more *older*.

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[1] See, further, what is said in the next part about Jewish marriages, under "Marriage and Religion."

Dividing the males into marrying for the first time, and remarrying, the records were as follows:

The Husband is—	On 100 Marriages Contracted in 1932 of—		
	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced Males
1 year or more *older*	64	82	81
Less than 1 year younger or older	19	8	5
1 year or more *younger*	17	10	14
Total	100	100	100

As remarrying widowers and divorced men are on an average older than the men marrying for the first time, and as at an *older* age an age-difference is relatively of less importance, for remarrying smaller percentages were expected as to marriages where husband and wife are of the same age. Next to this, one is struck by a decrease of those marriages where the husband is younger, so that the cases where he is older are strongly accentuated. This might be the consequence of a special preference of *remarrying* men for a young woman, but it may also be connected with the higher *age* of the remarrying males. For that reason the percentages of marriages where the husband is older are not only calculated for every civil condition separately, but also for different marrying ages of the husband.

MARRIAGES, WHERE THE HUSBAND IS OLDER, PER 100 MARRYING MEN OF EVERY CIVIL CONDITION IN EVERY AGE-GROUP

(*Percentage*)

Age at Marriage	Bachelors		Widowers	Divorced
Under 21 ..	31·1	60·3	50·0	60·4
21–24	50·4			
25–29	67·8			
30–39	76·4	76·5	77·0	81·4
40–49	77·4			
50 and over ..	87·5	87·5	90·0	96·5

The considerable increase of the percentages of marriages where the husband is older—parallel with the higher marrying age—proves indeed that with the advancing in years, the preference for a younger wife augments, but also that this holds good for bachelors, although this preference appears to be somewhat stronger among remarrying and especially among divorced men.

Further remarks concerning the *extent* of the difference in age may be given. Due to the fact that there are relatively few cases where the husband is younger than the wife, the following analysis only refers to marriages where the husband was the elder.

Age-Difference: Husband older by:	Per 100 with Younger Wives in 1932 marrying					
	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced Males	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced Males
	(All)			(30–49 Years)		
1–4 years ..	67·9	23·3	29·0	36·5	27·6	28·7
5–9 years ..	26·5	33·5	35·7	44·7	36·2	36·4
10–14 years ..	4·3	21·5	17·5	14·9	21·8	20·4
15–24 years ..	1·2	17·8	15·6	3·9	13·8	13·8
25 years and more ..	0·1	3·9	2·2	—	0·6	0·7
Total ..	100	100	100	100	100	100

In perfect correspondence with the preceding, it appears from the first three colums that, whereas on 100 marriages of *bachelors* with a younger woman 68 take place where the difference is not bigger than one to four years, these rates are much lower for *remarrying* (for divorced men and widowers only 29 per cent and 23 per cent respectively), while the *great* age-differences were especially recorded for the group of remarrying widowers.

The comparison becomes more exact if it is made for marrying persons of the same age-group, as it has been done in the last three columns for the group "30–49 years." In that case the difference between persons marrying for the first time and remarrying persons maintains itself, it is true, but the rates for widowers and divorced men are practically the same, and, although divorced men sooner than widowers marry a younger woman, as appeared above, there is no real disparity between the two groups, as far as the extent of the age-*difference* is concerned.

In discussing the *civil condition* of the marrying it was evident that the total marriage-frequency for widowers and widows was lower than for single or divorced persons. But what about the marriage-frequency among the unmarried, widowed, and divorced persons of *the same age*? The following figures have been calculated, which might throw a new light on these ratios.

As to the *males*, the frequency-rates for widowers and divorced men appear to be higher than those for bachelors. Further, those for widowers and divorced men diverge but little, and apparently widowers remarry as frequently as divorced men of the same age. The frequency-rates referring to *females* show that those for widows are lower than those for divorced women, but, apart from a few exceptions, they outnumber those for spinsters, *which means that at the same age the chance of a widow remarrying is greater than that of a spinster.*

ANNUAL AVERAGE OF MARRIAGES IN THE PERIOD 1929–32 PER 1,000 MALES AND FEMALES OF EVERY CIVIL CONDITION IN EVERY AGE-GROUP

Age-Group	MALES			FEMALES		
	Bachelors	Widowers	Divorced Males	Spinsters	Widows	Divorced Females
Under 21*	5·9	—	500·0	17·2	—	—
21–24	64·2	205·9	224·1	99·3	112·9	160·2
25–29	168·9	229·4	235·9	119·7	85·4	201·5
30–34	124·7	248·6	234·4	61·8	82·3	168·7
35–39	74·7	211·3	205·1	31·7	39·8	108·5
40–44	41·0	135·0	162·1	21·6	40·7	73·4
45–49	26·9	150·9	140·6	15·2	24·5	66·7
50–54	12·0	89·3	108·6	9·2	18·0	47·6
55–59	11·0	61·1	70·7	5·7	9·9	24·8
60–64	3·6	38·1	39·3	2·0	5·6	8·8
65–69	3·1	17·0	37·2	1·8	3·2	10·7
70–74	5·6	12·6	7·8	—	0·7	11·8
75–79	—	2·4	17·2	—	0·2	—
80 and over	—	0·8	18·5	—	—	—
Total	75·2	47·1	148·5	54·8	9·6	87·0

* Males, 18–21; females, 15–21.

This apparent contrast between these frequency-rates and those for the total number of remarrying widowers and widows is (for these groups) the consequence of the notable preponderance of the older age-groups, in comparison with unmarried and divorced persons. The relatively small number of marrying in these age-groups strongly diminishes the *total* frequency-rates for widowers and widows.





It is once more evident that, if we want to study these and similar ratios from a statistical point of view, an elaborate, detailed material has to be available. Only in that case a real insight into these ratios may be approximated.

The frequency-rates, mentioned in the table on page 33 for age-*groups*, can also be calculated for any particular age. Thus a so-called "nuptiality table"[1] is obtained, which sums up the chances of marriage for any year of life for both men and women of whatever civil condition (see graph, page 34).

It is further important to examine whether a *different social condition* involves also difference in marrying age. In order to trace this question, one can make use of the *profession records* of those marrying, where the main emphasis is laid, not on the nature of the profession (the technical side of it), but on the social position occupied by the representatives of certain professional groups.

The minimal conditions for existence which permit the founding and raising of a family are not always the same for every professional group, and are not reached in the different groups in the same way nor at the same age. The average workman is at his maximum wage-rate between the age of 20 and 25, and at that period there is no financial reason for postponement of marriage. Other groups, as, for instance, office employees, to which group lower functionaries may also be reckoned, who enjoy more or less regular yearly rises or periodical advances in wages, are rather more inclined to delay their marriage till a next promotion. For other groups still other circumstances can be of decisive influence.

The question is, whether all these factors are expressed in the figures referring to profession and age. For Amsterdam a few data are available since 1918. We quote the following records, referring to the period 1927–30.

PER 100 MARRYING MALES OF EVERY PROFESSION-GROUP WERE—

	Under 30 Years	30 Years and Older
(1) With leading position or working for own account	58·7	41·3
(2) In lower, subordinate professions ..	71·7	28·3

For the year 1932 there are records available which are divided, not only as to age, but also as to civil condition, according to more elaborate list of professions.

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[1] Huber prepared a similar table for France. (Tables de Nuptialité, 1925–27, *Bull. de la Statistique Générale de la France*, 1932–33, pp. 261 ff.)

PER 100 MALES, MARRYING FOR THE FIRST TIME, THERE WERE IN EACH PROFESSION-GROUP—

(*Percentage*)

	Under 25 Years	25–29 Years	30 Years and Older
(1) Higher positions in trade and industry and higher intellectual professions ..	9·3	43·5	47·2
(2) Lower administrative and office personnel	20·6	55·5	23·9
(3) Commercial and industrial middle classes	30·4	45·2	24·4
(4) Drivers and other expedition personnel	47·0	38·6	14·4
(5) Other workmen	45·5	37·6	16·9

In both tables differences for the separate social groups are clearly pointed out. The deviations, however, cannot be assigned merely to the difference in social position. Here, too, they may be partly the consequence of an unequal age-distribution of the unmarried in the mentioned profession groups. So, for instance, only few men will attain a "higher position in any branch of industry" before their twenty-fifth year, and already, on this ground, a low percentage of males under 25 among the marrying of this group is to be expected.

Generally speaking, the differences are of such nature that the early marriages in workmen classes manifest themselves sufficiently clearly.[1] It is not improbable that among these groups of the population, by the side of the factors of social nature mentioned above, also a relatively greater number of *forced* marriages causes the high percentage of early marriages. According to the investigations of Sanders,[2] the percentages of first children born within nine months after marriage are 5, 16, and 29 respectively for higher intellectuals, for functionaries and such like, and for industrial and commercial middle classes; for skilled workmen they come to 43, whereas among unskilled workmen they mount to 61.

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[1] Recent figures for comparison from other big towns are practically not available. The statistical annuaries of some foreign towns do give a division as to the profession of the marrying, but not in relation with their age. Therefore a research of Rubin and Westergaard, published long ago in *Statistik der Ehen*, Jena, 1890, is worth mentioning. They calculated the *average* age of the males and females married in Copenhagen during the period 1878–82. For the females there are but slight differences, for males the average age was at its lowest in the workmen-group.

[2] Sanders, *The Declining Birth-rate in Rotterdam*, 's Gravenhage, 1931, pp. 103 ff.

As regards the females, it is worth mentioning that (in 1932) out of those marrying for the first time 68 per cent, and out of the remarrying widows and divorced women respectively 29 per cent and 40 per cent, exercised a profession before their marriage. Especially for the first group this percentage will be higher in reality, as many women retire from their profession a short time before their marriage. These women will notify themselves at the registration of their marriage as being without any profession.[1]

We append a table giving age-distribution at marriage in some foreign towns (see p. 38).

In all these towns, Warsaw excepted, and for females also Rome, the percentage of males and females marrying before the age of 25 is everywhere lower than in Amsterdam. In some of these towns this holds also good for the group 25–29. Also marriages where *both* partners are younger than 25 occur more frequently in Amsterdam. This corresponds with the fact that in Amsterdam those who marry for the first time are somewhat stronger accentuated (see under "Civil Condition," page 24). The fact that the number of women who marry at the age of 50 and over is in Amsterdam proportionately higher than in all the other towns mentioned cannot be explained so easily, especially as in Amsterdam, in comparison with these towns, the *re*-marrying do not occupy such an important place, either among marrying males or among marrying females.

A separate investigation as to age and civil condition of the *marrying* put into relation with analogous data of the *total marriageable* population might give us the solution. In the same way we shall have to establish whether the supposition, based on the data mentioned above, is exact, namely, that in Amsterdam among the younger population-groups the marriage-intensity is

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[1] The statistical annuary of Basel gives a detailed division of the number of marrying females who exercise a profession (in 1934, 91 per cent of all the marrying females). This high rate, however, will be connected with the fact that "working women" in that part (in 1930) form 21 per cent of the total population (in Amsterdam 13 per cent) and 37 per cent of the total professional population (in Amsterdam 29 per cent). Besides, it appears here once more how difficult it is to come to an exact comparison.

AGE OF THE AGGREGATE MARRYING MALES AND FEMALES, RESPECTIVELY MARRYING FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN AMSTERDAM AND IN A NUMBER OF FOREIGN TOWNS DURING THE PERIOD 1926–30

Towns	Males					Females					Male and Female under 25 years per 100 Marriages
	Under 25	25–29	30–39	40–49	50 and Older	Under 25	25–29	30–39	40–49	50 and Older	
	Per 100 Marrying Males					*Per 100 Marrying Females*					
Hamburg	24·3	37·5	23·6	8·8	5·8	46·1	28·4	18·2	5·2	2·1	20
Warsaw (1928–30)	34·3	34·6	20·9	6·0	4·2	51·4	25·7	17·5	3·9	1·5	26
Budapest	21·0	33·5	28·9	10·1	6·5	42·8	25·5	23·0	6·4	2·3	16
Rome (1926–28)	24·7	37·8	26·1	6·9	4·5	51·9	23·3	17·7	5·0	2·1	20
Amsterdam	**30·6**	**38·3**	**19·8**	**6·1**	**5·2**	**51·1**	**27·1**	**14·5**	**4·5**	**2·8**	**26**
Bucarest*	32·9	33·2	23·1	7·2	3·6	59·7	21·6	14·2	3·4	1·1	29†
Leipzig (1926–28)	24·7	39·6	21·9	7·7	6·1	46·4	30·0	17·2	4·6	1·8	20
Dresden (1926–29)	19·2	43·2	24·0	7·1	6·5	40·7	34·9	18·2	6·2		15
Copenhagen	29·0	34·8	23·1	8·0	5·1	50·5	27·3	15·5	4·8	1·9	?
Lyons* (1927–30)	45·1	24·3	16·3	7·9	6·4	58·5	16·2	15·0	6·8	3·5	39†
Frankfort-a.-M.	17·5	41·6	26·8	7·8	6·3	37·3	36·9	19·3	4·9	1·6	13
Zürich	20·2	41·4	26·2	7·3	4·9	37·8	35·1	20·3	5·0	1·8	13
Basel	21·5	43·5	23·7	6·6	4·7	40·3	35·4	17·8	4·8	1·7	15
	Per 100 Marrying Bachelors					*Per 100 Marrying Spinsters*					
Hamburg	30·0	43·8	21·4	3·8	1·0	52·8	30·4	14·3	2·0	0·5	—
Warsaw (1928–30)	38·0	37·5	20·0	3·5	1·0	54·8	26·5	15·8	2·4	0·5	—
Budapest	26·3	39·7	27·1	5·3	1·6	49·9	26·8	19·1	3·4	0·9	—
Amsterdam	**35·3**	**43·6**	**17·8**	**2·6**	**0·7**	**56·0**	**28·3**	**12·2**	**2·7**	**0·8**	—
Leipzig (1926–28)	29·8	47·5	19·2	2·7	0·8	51·8	32·0	13·7	2·2	0·3	—
Dresden (1926–29)	23·3	50·6	22·2	3·0	0·9	44·9	36·9	15·4	2·8		—
Lyons* (1927–30)	54·1	27·2	13·8	3·3	1·6	67·5	16·8	11·7	3·0	1·0	—
Stockholm	17·8	41·6	33·6	5·8	1·2	36·5	35·9	22·6	4·1	0·9	—
Zürich	24·0	48·0	24·2	3·2	0·6	42·5	37·6	17·3	2·3	0·3	—
Basel	25·8	50·1	21·3	2·4	0·4	47·9	38·4	12·6	1·0	0·1	—

* Under 26, 26–30, 31–40, 41–50, 51 and older.

† Under 26 years.

greater than elsewhere.[1] Only then we can proceed to an investigation into the deeper causes of these differences (legal and clerical regulations, customs and habits, earlier sexual maturity, differences in race, climatic influences, economic structure, and social composition).

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[1] From the following comparison with the frequency-rates for Hamburg we can show that this, as to Hamburg, is really the case.

MARRIAGE-FREQUENCY PER 1,000 MARRIAGEABLE MALES IN EVERY AGE-GROUP

Age-Group	Hamburg (1925)	Amsterdam (1930–31)
18–20	0·9	5·9
21–24	31·8	64·4
25–29	135·7	170·1
30–34	144·0	134·9
35–39	133·4	100·4
40–44	101·5	71·6
45–49	80·0	66·8
50–54	51·2	49·1
55–59	42·6	38·3
60–64	25·9	25·5
65–69	14·5	14·3
70–74	5·8	11·2
Total ...	70·0	74·4

Among the frequency-rates for marriageable males under 30, the Amsterdam figures are higher; in the age-group 30–50 the Hamburg ones are in excess, and among the older age-groups the fluctuations are but slight, and as the total frequency-rates do not differ much either, one might conclude from the first-mentioned shift that males in Amsterdam found a family at a younger age than in Hamburg. Whether this is due to a local habit or to the circumstances that the Amsterdam men are financially sooner able to do so is another question.

[*To be continued*

THE POPULATION MOVEMENT OF HUNGARY AND THE REFORMS IN THE HUNGARIAN POPULATION STATISTICS

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A STUDY of the proportional figures bearing on the population movement in Hungary and a comparison of the ratio of the birth-rate, the death-rate, and the natural increase of the population with the figures bearing on the actual number of souls living in Hungary, shows a certain steady declining trend in the course of the last fifty years. The importance of this problem becomes even more impressive when we learn that in the course of the last five years the pace of this tendency of decline has rather been accelerated and that some improvements noted in this respect slackened off as compared with the returns of the previous quinquennium.

POPULATION RATIOS OF HUNGARY (PER 10,000)

Period	Births	Percentage Change	Deaths	Percentage Change	Natural Increase
1921–25	294		199		95
1926–30	260	− 11·6	170	− 14·6	90
1931–35	224	− 13·8	158	− 7·1	66

These figures give evidence of a distinct decline of the proportional increase of the population of present-day Hungary: the fall back in this respect amounted to 5·3 per cent between 1925–30, as compared with the previous five years. In the last bygone quinquennium the proportion amounts to 26·7 per cent, a disastrous figure exceeded only in the decennium which includes the time of the world war.

Comparing the proportional figures of the increase of population in Hungary with the proportional figures observed in other European countries, Hungary's position in that respect must not be considered as altogether unfavourable. The proportional birth-rate to 10,000 souls is surpassed only in the Balkan States (300), Poland (276), and Italy (238). The proportional death-rate in Hungary, however, is second after Roumania (206) alone. Considering the natural increase of population, conditions are more favourable only in the Balkan States, Poland, Italy, and Denmark.

Considering the lowest average of Hungarian demographic conditions, we may state that for the present, as well as in a number of previous bygone decades, Hungary in this respect occupies an intermediate position between the Eastern and Western States of Europe. In all other European countries the death-rate as well as the birth-rate have decreased almost equally, for the fall back of the birth-rate has not been counter-balanced by a corresponding reduction of mortality.

In the last five years the ratio of the absolute increase of the population in Hungary amounts to 66 per 10,000 instead of 90, as stated in the previous period, a decrease of 24 per 10,000; such a decline of absolute increase is unparalleled in Europe, Poland excepted. The steady fall in the birth-rate in Hungary has been observed for many years, and this unwholesome condition has been aggravated by the general economic crisis. It might be feared that what was considered to be a transitory evil may become a permanent one, and no measures should be left undone to prevent such a national disaster.

Let us consider the question in its details. We are aware of a steady proportional decrease of the birth-rate. In the last five years a constant tendency of births to decline was noted from 207 thousand to 189 thousand. In 1935 a proportional figure of 212 was under the average of the previous last five years and half the number for fifty years ago. These figures give evidence of a big-scale decline of the fruitfulness of marriages and justify a vigorous and permanent control of demographic movements, as well as increased scientific statistical researches.

When we examine the result of two official censuses at ten years interval between them, we find an approximately 10 per cent decrease of the number of children born in wedlock, their mothers living at the time of the census. In 1920 there were 362 children to 100 women of this category; in 1930 there were only 327. Another scheme was made, counting the progeny of deceased married mothers of that period. Here figures showed but slight alterations: instead of 387 children to each hundred mothers in 1920 there were 382 to each hundred in 1930. In this relation, when returns were made on marriages ended by death, however, two-thirds of these had been maintained for over twenty years; therefore the proportional figures of restrained fruitfulness (the other third lasting less than twenty years) is not made clear in these returns.

However, when we consider the period of duration of marriage as compared to the number of offspring, we can note a considerable decline in the number of births. Comparing the average returns of the years 1903–05 with those of 1933–35, the fruitfulness of marriage here declined in the following proportions:

COUPLES MARRIED

	Per cent
For less than 5 years by	20·0
From 5 to 9 years	30·8
From 10 to 19 years	35·7
For over 20 years by	9·0

Taking the total number of marriages, it is equivalent to a 7·7 per cent decline. In order to show the demographic condition of the rural population in this respect, we have to distinguish between the returns given by the autonomous towns from those given by the counties: the latter will show an approximate account of the villagers' conditions. Taking this statement as a basis, we may say that the decline of the rural population's fertility is less than that of the towns. The detailed returns make it also evident that as to the period of duration of marriage, proportional figures show better results first in the case of one child, than for childless families, but a decline is visible in the proportional number of progeny when returns on other married couples are filed on the basis of the number of years for which they have been united.

The total figures of the deaths amounted to 140,000 – 150,000 between 1921–30; 134,000 in 1930; under 130,000 in 1933 and 1934.

The average figures of the death-rate amounted to 312 to the 10,000 between 1880–1900, and this item was reduced to an average of 158 in the last quinquennium. This is equivalent to a 50 per cent reduction in half a century. However, the rate of this improvement is unsatisfactory as compared to the figures of the progress achieved in the preceding five years, and also unsatisfactory when we consider that this evident improvement does not counterbalance the corresponding proportional decline of the birth-rate: comparison of these two figures yields a loss of 50 per cent. The last data at our disposition being those of the census made in 1930, our observations are limited to this point. The death-rate shows an improvement in the case of minors only, and an increase in the mortality of able-bodied and elderly people.

In the years 1900 and 1901 the average mortality of infants and children up to 14 amounted to 53·7 per cent of the total death-rate, and in 1930 and 1931 it is only equivalent to 33·9 per cent. Doubtless these figures are influenced by the decrease in the proportion of adult and infant members of the total population; however, it cannot be denied that it is also influenced by a reduction of mortality amongst minors. The proportional death-rate of infants was stationary with 73·2 per cent of the total death-rate both in 1900–01 and 1930–31, but it has been reduced at that latter period to 36·6 per cent in the case of children 1–2 years old, to 31·2 per cent in the case of the 3–4 years old, to 34·1 per cent for the 5–9 years old, and 45·6 per cent in the case of 10–14 years old children. The death-rate of every category of older people up to 65 varies in the index numbers up to a fraction above 62 per cent as a minimum and 68·4 per cent as a maximum. Again the death-rate is less favourable in the case of persons above 65, the index number in this case amounting over 70. A factor of great importance should be noted: the conditions of public health among the rural population have much improved as compared to those of the towns. In 1900 infant mortality amounted to 260 out of 1,000 infants; this average was reduced to 185 in the towns and to 173 in the country, a result of the increasing efforts made in Hungary to promote social hygiene. There is an urgent demand for the further development of measures that are of immediate necessity. Speaking of country folk in general is equivalent to saying the agricultural population of this country, which is the only stratum of the population partly showing hitherto favourable returns on the birth-rate tables.

If, in the future, we have to face a further reduction of the birth-rate in the same proportion, we notice to-day that the rural population will be the sole stratum of the people which can be expected to guarantee an increase of the population. In the future, however, appropriate protective measures to that effect will have to be applied in administration.

We learn from the figures of the death-rate that in the course of thirty years the average length of human life in Hungary has increased by approximately three years, and a prolongation of life time may possibly be expected in the future. However, this supposition can be applied to minors only. The figures of the statistical returns are stationary in the case of grown-up men and there is but a slight divergency concerning women.

In the last thirty years considerable changes have been shown by statistics when the population is grouped according to age. This is due to the decline of the birth-rate of children born in lawful wedlock and to the changes noticed in the rate of mortality. In 1930 there were 250,000 humans up to 14 years of age, meaning a 10 per cent decrease as compared to the figures of 1910. Thus even the evident improvement of infants' and children's mortality as stated in the returns is insufficient to make up for the loss due to the decrease of births.

Here we face the most vital and burning population problem of present-day Hungary: the people's force of expansion is evidently declining. Obviously, the Statistical Service finds itself in duty bound to give these problems an increasing attention, and to study the various aspects of the questions on hand from a number of different standpoints. The considerable decrease of the birth-rate is not sufficiently compensated by a parallel decrease of infant mortality, and forces the Royal Hungarian Central Bureau of Statistics to find new fields for its activity. Hitherto data on these subjects have been collected periodically and only partially; this system was quite adequate in the past, but now, facing the present condition with its decline in the birth-rate and insufficient decrease of mortality to compensate, the defects of the present method are obvious and must be altered in the future.

Hungarian statistical returns give twofold data on the fertility of marriages. Periodically and annually these figures are at our disposition, (*a*) since 1920, the results of the census. However, these data are not fully satisfactory and are incomplete for the purpose of scientific researches. We are unable to draw conclusions and to make the necessary comparisons with the insufficient material on hand. (*b*) Since the beginning of this century the figures on married women's progeny has been given in annual returns only in those cases when the decease of women of this category has been registered.

We see the eminent importance of keeping in evidence figures bearing on children born in wedlock, and the data on the census papers produced at a ten years' interval do not meet the demands of the present day; neither can we be satisfied with tables of returns stating the fecundity of marriages only when the mother's death is registered. The total number of wedded women in Hungary amounts to 1·9 millions approximately, 16,000–17,000 of whom die annually. However, two-thirds of their number registered among the deaths have been married for more than twenty years, and, according to the returns of the last census, less than 34 per cent of the total of married women lived in wedlock for more than twenty years. A serious impediment in the scientific and permanent study of the mortality is the fact that returns at our disposition include only the data collected in the years when data are compiled for a general census.

Considering these defects in the general scheme of collecting Hungarian data, an urgent need arises for a different and more efficient method of collecting returns. At the first meeting held by the Hungarian Section of the International Union of Scientific Research Population Problems a motion to that effect was passed. When this speech of introduction was prepared, the idea of the necessity of this measure was partly due to the study of the object on hand. The Royal Hungarian Central Bureau of Statistics wishes to help the Hungarian collaborators on the above-mentioned organized work by the following proceedings: From January 1, 1937, birth certificates are required to state the date of the parents' marriage. Up to now thees certificates already mentioned whether the infant was the first, second, etc., child born of this union; thus statistical data on the fruitfulness of marriage will be tenfold increased. Returns will also include in this scheme about 10 per cent more of the total number of married women than in the past. Besides these figures, newly wed wives will be kept in evidence with their age and data of marriage stated annually; unions ended by death or divorce will be eliminated. The age of women and the data of their contracted marriage will also be included in the returns. The figures stating the number of children born in wedlock will have to be revised annually in conformity with the data required on birth certificates. Considerable data will be annually at our disposal in this way, enabling us to frame more accurate returns on the fruitfulness of marriages. For the next few years we shall have to be contented with approximate figures on this subject, because, since the last census, data have not been collected and grouped adequately. However, after the next census it will be possible to make reliable returns.

Researches bearing on the proportion of mortality have also been provided for; since the last few years we have had annual returns at our disposal grouping the entire population according to their ages. The calculations on the death-rate will be improved by this scheme. For the last few years we have had annual returns bearing on the population and grouping them according to their age, and these items will be compared with the similar data of the death-rate at our disposal. By these means we will be able to calculate the ratio of mortality in Hungary as well as the index numbers of the death-rate, and have at our disposal detailed information on the conditions of mortality in Hungary.

THE TREND OF THE BIRTH-RATE IN THE ORIENTAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

By S. J. HOLMES

The increase of the Oriental population of the Pacific Coast of the United States has long been a matter of concern to the white inhabitants of this region. Now that the immigration of Chinese and Japanese has been reduced to relatively small proportions, expressions of alarm over the situation have mainly ceased. The problems presented by the Chinese were mainly economic. Since most of the Chinese were immigrant males, many of whom returned to their native country, they were not commonly regarded as likely to increase unduly after the passage of the exclusion act. It was quite otherwise with the Japanese. The largely male immigrants of the 'nineties and the first decade of the present century were soon followed by an extensive influx of women, many of whom were the so-called picture brides. They came in by the thousand, over twenty thousand in five years. Before 1909, the date of the Gentlemen's Agreement, male immigrant outnumbered females over six to one. For several years after 1909 incoming females outnumbered males by about two and one-half to one. The Japanese birth-rate became portentously high. In 1920 the crude birth-rate in California reached the remarkable figure of 69·93 per thousand, and since the Japanese population at that time consisted largely of males (in the ratio of 171 males to 100 females) the rate was still more impressive. As the birth-rate of the white population of California in 1920 was 18·60 per thousand, the possibility of being outbred by the more fertile Japanese loomed up ominously in the future and became the topic of much comment in the Press of the Pacific coast. The Japanese birth-rate being over three times as high as that of the whites, it was easy to predict that it would be only a few generations before the majority of the inhabitants of California would be Japanese.

These forebodings as a rule took no account of the age composition of the Japanese population nor of the fact that the birth-rate of immigrant stocks in a new country tends in a few generations to approximate that of the native population. Apparently it was not generally perceived that in a population containing few children the birth-rate per thousand inhabitants would naturally be high. The more children that are born the more rapidly the crude birth-rate declines. From the nature of the case it was impossible that the high birth-rate of 1920 could be maintained, if for no other reason than that it contributed to its own statistical decline. It has, in fact, fallen at a very rapid rate.

Now that immigration of the Chinese and Japanese is checked, although not entirely prevented, and the flood of picture brides has been stayed, and a new generation of Orientals is growing up in our midst, it may be of interest to take account of the trend of the Oriental birth-rate in the light of recent changes. Adequate statistics on births in the Oriental population in the United States are of recent date. Most of the Orientals are confined to the Pacific states of Oregon, Washington, and California, and the Chinese and Japanese in California greatly outnumber those of Washington and Oregon combined. California and Oregon were admitted to the Registration Area for births in 1919, and Washington in 1917. In California the number of births in the Japanese reached its maximum (5,271) in 1921, when there was one birth among the Japanese to about twelve among the whites. In 1934 there was one birth among the Japanese to about forty among the whites. Up to 1930 the number of white births had been slowly increasing, while those of the Japanese had been decreasing. Owing probably to the financial depression, the number of births in the whites after 1930 actually decreased notwithstanding the increasing white population of the state, the birth-rate reaching its lowest point in 1933, followed by a slight rise in 1934. Among the Japanese the decreasing number of births has continued to 1934 without interruption. Japanese births in

TABLE I

JAPANESE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Year	Total	Male	Female	Percentage Male
1870	55	—	—	—
1880	148	—	—	—
1890	2,039	1,780	259	87·3
1900	24,326	23,341	985	96·0
1910	72,157	63,070	9,087	87·4
1920	111,010	72,707	38,303	65·5
1930	138,834	81,771	57,063	58·9

1934 were less than one-third of the number in 1920, and they have decreased by over 25 per cent since 1930.

Measured in the usual manner, the Japanese birth-rate between 1920 and 1930 has fallen from 69·93 to 22·82 in California; from 52·77 to 15·13 in Oregon; and from 66·71 to 21·01 in Washington. The birth-rates of the later date are no higher than the general birth-rates of the United States ten years previously, and they are still lower now.

In interpreting the crude Japanese birth-rate one should make allowance for the marked excess of males. A much more satisfactory measure of the relative fertility of the Japanese and whites is the number of births per thousand females of child-bearing age (15 to 44 years). Our census data do not give the number of Japanese females in the various age-groups for the several states, but only for the United States as a whole. In the United States there were in 1930 about 3,080 registered Japanese births to 24,965 females, aged 15 to 44 years, or a rate of 123·4 per thousand. There were 3,060 Japanese born in the Registration Area for births, which then included all of the states except Texas and South Dakota. In Texas there were 14 Japanese children under one year of age, according to the census of 1930, and if the number of births bore the same ratio to children under one year of age in Texas as in the other states, there would be about 19 Japanese births in Texas. Including one extra birth for the very small Japanese population of South Dakota, we may reckon 3,080 as the approximate number of registered Japanese births in the entire United States. In the Registration Area for births for 1930, the number of births per thousand white women, aged 15 to 44 years, was 79·4. In 1930, therefore, Japanese women were over 50 per cent more fertile than women of the white race.

We may compare the fertility of Japanese and whites in another way by calculating the ratios of children under five years of age per thousand women, aged 15 to 44 years. This method of comparison avoids the errors due to incompleteness of birth registration, and it also has certain advantages in partly eliminating the influence of mortality in infancy and early childhood. It affords a fairly satisfactory index of the natural increase of a people, although it suffers from the drawback that the enumeration of children under five years of age has in practically all censuses fallen considerably below the true number. In 1930 the number of children under five years per thousand Japanese women aged 15 to 44 years in the United States was 709·0. In 1930 the number of children under five years per thousand white women in the same age-group was 386·2. According to this measure, the Japanese rate of increase preponderated more over that of the whites than would be indicated by the difference in the number of births. This fact is due in part to the rapid decrease in the number of Japanese births before 1930, the number of children under five being a product of the higher birth-rates of the preceding years. It may be also that the number of births attributed to the Japanese is too low owing to less nearly complete registration of births.

In the light of the preceding data it is evident that the birth-rate of the Japanese population greatly exceeds that of the white population of the United States as a whole. How high a birth-rate would be required for the continued maintenance of the Japanese population cannot be estimated with accuracy because of the absence of data on age specific birth-rates. The crude death-rate of the Japanese is very low, but this is owing largely to their favourable age-distribution. There are very few Japanese in the older age-groups. In 1930 less than 8 per cent of the males and less than 2 per cent of females were over 54 years of age, as compared with over 12 per cent for both sexes in the general population. As a rule the Japanese appear to be a sturdy, healthy people. Their infant death-rate is not high (56 per thousand births in 1930), and for the most part they live under relatively wholesome conditions. There can be no doubt that the reproductive rate of the Japanese is amply sufficient to secure a fairly rapid increase in a stabilized population. This cannot be said of the whites, especially in most of the Western and Northern states and in California. Table II, showing the rapidly decreasing number of births among the Japanese, along with a much larger and, in general, increasing number of births in the whites, might lead one to infer that the population problem presented by the Japanese is rapidly solving itself. This conclusion would be a grave error. In California, where the greater part of the Japanese are concentrated, the increasing number of births among the whites results, in part, from the favourable age-composition of the white women and the extensive and continuous immigration from other states. It is only when we go back of the impressive figures of the table and concentrate our attention on relative

TABLE II

BIRTHS IN CALIFORNIA ACCORDING TO RACE, 1919–34

Year	White			Negro			Japanese			Chinese		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1919	50,707	29,427	21,280	552	437	115	4,525	1,938	2,587	496	382	114
1920	60,739	35,857	24,822	657	505	152	5,032	2,248	2,784	524	405	119
1921	65,457	38,054	27,403	730	570	160	5,271	2,304	2,967	617	484	133
1922	66,462	38,587	27,875	749	580	160	5,065	2,327	2,738	773	601	162
1923	73,117	43,271	29,846	890	677	213	5,022	2,282	2,740	812	636	176
1924	80,224	47,745	32,479	976	748	228	4,475	2,105	2,370	988	787	201
1925	78,362	46,688	31,674	1,023	788	235	4,574	2,239	2,335	919	735	184
1926	77,103	45,828	31,275	1,079	804	275	3,612	1,780	1,832	860	666	194
1927	79,024	46,819	32,205	953	778	175	3,249	1,656	1,593	911	754	157
1928	78,700	45,749	32,951	888	695	193	2,816	1,399	1,417	826	666	160
1929	77,065	43,999	33,066	826	629	197	2,370	1,222	1,148	776	647	229
1930	78,773	53,019	25,754	1,003	811	192	2,224	1,334	890	802	685	217
1931	64,921	43,367	21,554	1,152	929	223	2,035	1,155	880	789	672	117
1932	62,928	41,622	21,306	1,188	978	210	1,865	1,074	791	742	633	109
1933	60,762	39,891	20,871	1,188	969	219	1,617	900	717	671	565	106
1934	63,433	41,412	22,021	1,178	955	223	1,591	909	682	602	521	91
	Birth-rate											
1920	18·60	15·38	—	16·95	14·90	—	69·93	—	—	18·19	—	—
1930	15·63	14·16	—	12·38	11·49	—	22·82	—	—	21·47	—	—

rates of increase that the true picture of the present situation is brought out. Instead of being overwhelmed by the more rapid increase of whites, the Japanese, despite the appearance of the figures, are really more than holding their own in the struggle for numerical supremacy. If we imagine California cut off from the surrounding world by a barrier that prevents all migration into and out of the state, and if white and Japanese females should produce precisely as many babies in each age-period as they did in 1930, the white population would eventually be decreasing quite rapidly, whereas the Japanese population would show a fairly substantial growth. Despite appearances, the stabilized, or "true," rates of natural increase of the two races in California are very different, and if they operated over a period of several generations they would make a marked change in the ethnic composition of the people. One cannot, of course, assume that the present age specific rates of reproduction among the Japanese will be maintained. Probably they will not. They may even be reduced sufficiently to cause the Japanese eventually to disappear. If the Japanese copy the reproductive mores of their white neighbours, this will certainly be their fate.

A generation ago many circumstances favoured a high Japanese birth-rate. The Japanese were very young and were drawn mainly from an economic class in which the birth-rate tends to be high. Many of them settled on the land, which they were ambitious to acquire to bequeath to their children. Among the rural Japanese the policy of having many offspring was deliberately fostered. Children were useful assets in cultivating the fields, and religious traditions encouraged fertility. The Japanese women were mostly young, and the percentage married was unusually high. The percentage of Japanese women over 15 years of age who were married rose from 48·0 in 1900 to 84·0 in 1910, and still further to 91·5 in 1920, after which, owing to the oncoming of the second generation, it fell to 81·4 in 1930. Contrasted with these data are the percentages of the white women over 15 years of age who were married. These percentages were 60·6 in 1920 and 61·3 in 1930. The Japanese women began their reproductive careers early in life, and for some years at least they commonly had children in rapid succession.

While the age-composition of Japanese females is not very favourable for a high birth-rate, inasmuch as in 1930 43·7 per cent were in the child-bearing period as compared with 50·2 per

TABLE III

BIRTHS IN OREGON ACCORDING TO RACE, 1919–34

Year	White			Negro			Chinese			Japanese		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1919	13,215	5,006	8,209	20	18	2	39	24	15	214	113	101
1920	14,561	6,004	8,557	28	23	5	42	34	8	219	115	104
1921	15,058	6,082	8,976	17	16	1	45	37	8	263	150	113
1922	14,512	5,884	8,628	35	28	9	40	34	6	286	166	120
1923	14,600	5,756	8,844	32	26	6	35	27	8	222	124	98
1924	15,287	6,143	9,144	22	18	4	35	33	2	227	112	115
1925	15,073	6,081	8,992	20	18	2	53	40	13	241	129	112
1926	14,440	5,904	8,496	26	17	9	34	29	5	177	90	87
1927	14,288	5,848	8,380	21	18	3	43	37	6	156	84	72
1928	13,724	5,541	8,183	32	22	10	31	30	1	133	78	55
1929	12,933	5,264	7,669	25	22	3	31	26	5	129	67	62
1930	13,207	6,072	7,135	24	17	7	29	28	1	75	47	34
1931	12,946	5,803	7,143	18	13	5	34	32	2	78	50	28
1932	12,563	5,588	6,975	24	16	8	22	21	1	70	28	42
1933	11,964	5,422	6,522	16	12	4	24	24	0	58	29	29
1934	12,831	5,955	6,876	18	12	6	19	15	4	50	18	32
						Birth-rate						
1920	18·93	15·63	—	13·05	12·47	—	13·59	—	—	52·77	—	—
1930	13·57	12·59	—	10·74	11·12	—	13·97	—	—	15·13	—	—

TABLE IV

BIRTHS IN WASHINGTON ACCORDING TO RACE, 1917–34

Year	WHITE			NEGRO			CHINESE			JAPANESE		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1917	22,349	10,082	12,267	69	58	11	31	30	1	773	494	279
1918	24,546	11,728	12,818	78	57	21	36	31	5	818	522	296
1919	23,785	11,638	12,147	60	48	12	29	25	4	985	696	289
1920	25,608	12,885	12,723	89	68	21	37	36	1	1,160	834	326
1921	25,652	12,491	13,161	56	42	14	32	28	4	1,281	914	377
1922	23,982	11,772	12,210	72	50	22	42	38	4	1,043	680	363
1923	23,777	11,988	11,789	76	54	22	38	36	2	1,077	722	355
1924	24,012	12,255	11,757	71	61	10	48	43	5	934	639	295
1925	23,480	12,279	11,201	66	50	16	46	43	3	877	575	302
1926	22,871	11,859	11,012	72	55	17	41	35	6	706	450	256
1927	22,391	11,616	10,775	58	51	7	43	39	4	533	306	227
1928	22,218	11,877	10,341	77	56	11	44	41	3	495	323	172
1929	21,825	11,881	9,944	82	61	21	34	32	2	435	275	160
1930	22,201	13,671	8,530	62	57	5	41	40	1	375	225	150
1931	21,252	12,873	8,379	67	58	9	39	35	4	327	209	118
1932	20,654	12,431	8,223	50	43	7	39	35	4	283	186	97
1933	20,245	12,407	7,838	67	52	15	33	31	2	202	133	62
1934	21,896	13,789	8,107	70	63	7	22	21	1	180	111	69
						Birth-rate						
1920	19·40	17·66	—	12·94	11·77	—	15·65	—	—	66·71	—	—
1930	14·60	15·85	—	9·07	9·79	—	18·69	—	—	21·01	—	—

cent of white females, within a few years, when the females of ages 5 to 14 reach womanhood, there will be proportionally more women in the reproductive period. An inspection of the table (V) giving the age-grouping of the Japanese female population will make evident that as compared with the whites the Japanese cohorts, who will become adolescent during the next decade, are relatively well filled with recruits. These groups, of course, will be reduced somewhat by deaths, but not to a very great extent, since they include persons in the healthiest period of life. Among the Japanese, the groups 5 to 9 and 10 to 14 years of age will take the place of groups which are now much less numerous. On the other hand, when the youngest females pass beyond the reproductive period, their places will be taken by less numerous cohorts, resulting from the lower birth-rate of the present and the near future.

TABLE V

AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE FEMALES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930

Age Group	Chinese		Japanese	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
0–4	2,734	18·0	8,622	15·1
5–9	2,676	17·7	11,748	20·6
10–14	1,573	10·4	7,282	12·8
15–19	1,231	8·1	3,487	6·1
20–24	1,143	7·5	2,369	4·2
25–29	1,367	9·0	4,247	7·4
30–34	1,123	7·4	6,073	10·6
35–44	1,869	12·3	8,789	15·4
45–54	938	6·2	3,479	6·1
55–64	347	2·3	808	1·4
65–74	97	0·6	98	0·2
75 +	22	0·1	11	—
Unknown	32	0·2	50	0·1

One may expect the future fertility of the Japanese population to appear in waves which will gradually smooth out in the course of time. The waves had their start in the irregular influx of the original immigrant population. The extensive influx of females between 1915 and 1924 largely accounts for the high birth-rate in 1919 and the few following years. The rapid fall of the birth-rate after the early 'twenties is mainly due to the restrictions on the incoming of picture brides and the ageing of the women already admitted.

The extent to which birth-control prevails among the Japanese of the United States is uncertain, but doubtless it will increase as they become more Americanized in spirit and custom. Since the passage of legislation restricting land ownership by Japanese immigrants, the Japanese population has become more urban. A glance down the columns of Table II, giving urban and rural births in California, will reveal the fact that while in 1919 and the early twenties the majority of Japanese births occurred in rural areas, there has been since 1927 an increasing proportion of births in the cities. Doubtless the restriction of land ownership, which has led many Orientals to seek urban employment, has been one factor leading to their reduced number of births.

With increasing education, which the Japanese are eager to acquire, and with greater cultural assimilation, there will probably follow a still further and possibly extensive reduction of fertility. If California continues, as it probably will, to have a very low birth-rate, and if the growth of its population is dependent upon migration from other states, then its Japanese population, in so far as it comes to adopt the mores of the whites, will gradually decrease in numbers. Most of the Japanese in the United States are in regions of inadequate reproduction. How this circumstance will affect their natural increase remains for the future to decide.

The trend of natural increase in the Chinese population of the United States differs in several respects from that of the Japanese. Like the Japanese, the Chinese who first came were chiefly male workers, who engaged in various occupations at a time when there was much demand for labour. Later the competition with Chinese labour was keenly felt by American workers, and led to strong opposition to Chinese immigration. The exclusion acts of the eighties stopped most of the influx, although certain favoured classes are still admitted; many come in from Hawaii and the Philippines, and an uncertain number is smuggled in illegally. In 1890, when the first census following the exclusion acts was taken, the Chinese population of the United States reached its maximum of 107,488. After this it slowly decreased until 1920. In 1890 the percentage of males among the Chinese was 96·4, the maximum percentage. With the reduction of their numbers through death and the return of many to their native country, the slow natural increase of the Chinese population failed to compensate for its losses. The proportion of female immigrants, at first very small, gradually increased. This fact, and the oncoming of the second generation, increased the percentage of females in the Chinese population, and later increased the crude Chinese birth-rate.

Our knowledge of the birth-rate of the Chinese was unsatisfactory before the admission of California to the Registration Area for births in 1919. After this date, as shown in Table II, there was an increase in the number of births up to 1924, after which there was a slow reduction. This decline is probably owing to the ageing of the Chinese immigrant women. The decline is much less spectacular than that of the Japanese because there was no flood of picture brides. The reproduction of the Chinese, unlike that of the Japanese, follows a fairly even course. The Chinese, being an older immigrant population, have a larger proportion of persons in the advanced age-groups. To a greater extent than the Japanese they have now come to consist of native-born individuals. The change in their crude birth-rate, which always has to be interpreted in the light of age and sex composition, presents striking differences from that of the Japanese. In the latter the birth-rate in California changed from 69·93 in 1920 to 22·82 in 1930, while in the Chinese it changed from 18·19 to 21·47, despite an increased population. The disproportion of the sexes, while not so great as formerly, is still much greater than in the Japanese, and greatly reduces the crude birth-rate.

TABLE VI

CHINESE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Year	Total	Male	Female	Percentage Male
1860	34,633	33,159	1,784	94·9
1870	63,199	58,633	4,566	92·8
1880	105,465	100,686	4,779	95·5
1890	107,488	103,620	3,868	96·4
1900	89,863	85,341	4,522	95·0
1910	71,531	66,856	4,675	93·5
1920	61,639	53,891	7,748	87·4
1930	74,954	59,802	15,152	79·8

The only way in which to obtain even an approximate index of the natural increase of the Chinese is to study the fertility of Chinese women in the reproductive ages. A calculation of the number of children under 5 years of age in 1930 per thousand women, aged 15 to 44 years, gives a ratio of 858·6, as compared with 709·0 for the Japanese and 388·0 for total whites. This high fertility of Chinese women (more than double that of the whites) is all the more remarkable for two reasons: First, the percentage of Chinese women who are married is much lower than among the Japanese; of the Chinese women over 15 years of age, 69·1 per cent were married in 1920, and 68·2 per cent in 1930, as compared with the percentages among the Japanese of 91·5 and 81·4 for these respective dates. A second factor, which one would expect would lead to a lower birth-rate, is the urban distribution of the Chinese population. The census of 1930 gave 65,778 Chinese as urban and 3,211 as rural farm, and 5,965 as rural non-farm. Over 87 per cent of the Chinese, therefore, lived in cities in 1930. A glance at Tables II to IV will show that since 1919 the great majority of Chinese births have occurred in cities. That the Chinese birth-rate is amply sufficient to yield a fairly rapid increase in a stabilized population there can be no doubt. Their general death-rate is not very high, and their infant mortality rate per thousand births in 1930 was only 55·1. The Chinese present the unusual spectacle of a mainly urban population whose birth-rate is sufficient for continued maintenance. It would be of interest to ascertain how the fertility of the American-born Chinese compares with that of the original immigrants, but our statistics do not enable one to separate these groups. The recent change from a diminishing to an increasing population is mainly the result of the natural increase of the American-born Chinese. Immigration has been a factor of importance in this increase, however, as is indicated in Table VII.

Doubtless increase through immigration is considerably greater than the official figures indicate, because many who are stated to be native-born really entered illegally from abroad. This is evident not only from reports of smuggling in Chinese from Mexico and elsewhere, but from the figures on the sex ratios of the so-called native-born Chinese. The figures on the number of native-born Chinese by sex given in the census reports of 1900 and 1910 present some telltale peculiarities. The percentage of males given for native-born Chinese in 1900 was 73·9. In 1910 the so-called native-born Chinese consisted of 11,921 males and 3,014 females, giving a sex ratio of 79·8. As is stated in the report of the United States census for 1910, "It is incredible that such a great disparity really exists in any class of population actually born in this country." Since the sex ratio shows remarkably little variation in all races of man, and since the birth records of the Chinese in this country present no exception to the general rule, there is only one conclusion to be drawn from the data, namely, that a large proportion of Chinese males returned as native-born were really born outside the United States. It is a notorious fact that many Chinese entering illegally have been certified as native-born by their accommodating fellow countrymen, thus acquiring at one stroke the privilege not only of residence but also of citizenship. A report to the United States Commission of Immigration in 1933 states that: "By this method thousands of Chinese—upon the admission of the Chinese themselves—have been allowed not only to enter and remain in the United States but declared to be native-born citizens, each with a vote and qualified to participate in the political affairs of this country." The sexes of the native-born Japanese show a fairly close approximation to the expected ratio.

TABLE VII

IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION BY COUNTRY OF LAST AND FUTURE PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Years	Admissions		Departures	
	China	Japan	China	Japan
1841–1850	35	—	—	—
1851–1860	41,397	—	—	—
1861–1870	64,301	186	—	—
1871–1880	123,201	149	—	—
1881–1890	61,711	2,270	—	—
1891–1900	14,799	25,942	—	—
1901–1910	20,605	129,797	—	—
1911–1920	21,278	83,837	22,742	16,629
1921–1930	29,907	33,467	40,376	20,178
1931–1934	3,824	2,177	16,153	4,463
1908–1930	—	—	72,796	50,410

SOCIO-BIOLOGICAL STUDIES IN THE BALKANS—III[1]

INFANT AND MATERNAL MORTALITY IN BULGARIAN VILLAGES, WITH A BACKGROUND OF GENERAL CONDITIONS

By OLIVE LODGE, M.A.

CONDITIONS in most Bulgarian villages are very "primitive," and Western ideas of comfort and sanitation are absent. Before giving exact figures and tables of infant and maternal mortality, I think it well to give a short account of the people whose family histories supply the material for my statistics, together with some description of their general conditions of life.

PART I

I

It is generally considered that the Bulgars are descended from Turanian tribes who migrated to the Balkan Peninsula some time in the seventh or eighth centuries of our era. They settled in the eastern mountains and plains towards the Black Sea, mixing with the earlier-come Slavs, whose language they adopted.

The Bulgars, like the rest of the Balkan peoples, were conquered by the Turks at the end of the fourteenth century, became free in 1878 through the instrumentality of Russia, and are now governed by an hereditary monarchy.

Most Bulgars belong to the now autonomous Bulgarian Orthodox Church, though some, the Pomaks, descend from Bulgarian converts to Islam. There are also some Roman Catholics. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, during the latter period of Ottoman rule, suffered as did other Balkan countries, and, indeed, for a longer time than the Serbian Church, from the substitution of Phanariot Greeks from Constantinople for the native clergy. This intrusion has greatly affected the attitude of the people in their social and political development.

The peasants, for the most part, are of medium height, dark, and thick-set, with short arms and broad, short-fingered hands, though in some mountain regions the men are tall. Some Bulgars show traces of Oriental ancestry; others look pure Slav. The peasants are generally slow of speech and movement, dour, and suspicious of strangers. Yet in some villages of the western and central districts I met with friendly hospitality.

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[1] My grateful thanks are due to the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems for the grants in aid of research which have enabled me to carry out this piece of work.

The original Bulgars arrived as a number of tribes, who settled in the different districts inhabited by their descendants, still distinguished by different traits, customs, and ceremonies.

In the mountainous districts of the north-west, round Sofia, and along the Jugoslav frontier dwell peasants in whom Slav characteristics prevail. Most of these villagers are known as Red or White Shopi, according to the patterns on their national dress. Descendants of other of these Slav tribes, often called Old Bulgarians, still inhabit the region along the south side of the Danube, the Gersoyi from Lom in the west to Ruse (Rustchuk) in the east, reaching down to the region of the Plevenski round Pleven, while in the central mountains round the old capital of Veliko Trnovo dwell the Trnovski. Many of the villages round the ancient town of Plovdiv (Philippopolis) are inhabited by Slavs and Turks. Around Malko Trnovo, in the south-east near the Turkish border, live a branch of the Rupei who have become Slavisized; while Turks (Tozluki or Tozlutsi) inhabit the region between Osman Pasha and Veliko Trnovo. They came originally from Asia Minor, settling in Bulgaria after the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and the Turkish conquest of the country.

In Eastern Bulgaria, roughly speaking between Ruse on the Danube and Varna on the Black Sea, are found, in the more western parts, the Gagus or Christian Turks.[1] Their mother-tongue is Turkish, but they are Orthodox in religion, their ancestors having been converted to Christianity some two hundred years ago. The women still speak only Turkish, but the men now know Bulgarian, while the children are taught Bulgarian at school, and to call themselves Bulgars and not Gagus. The more western region is inhabited by the Gadjalens, Turks who have remained Moslems. Both Gagus and Gadjalens originally settled here in the seventh century.

The Gerlofski, considered to be a branch of the Northern Serveri, are Slavs, but speak Turkish, and are now Moslems, having given up Christianity for Mohammedanism about two hundred years ago. They are found in the valleys between the Preslav and Balkan Mountains.

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[1] I have spoken of the Gagus as "Turks," because that is what they are called locally. But there is a good deal of speculation as to what they really are.

In the wilder regions of the Rhodope mountains live the Pomaks, mostly charcoal-burners, who are Bulgarian by race and speech, but Moslem in faith.[1] These peasants, so the Christians told me, accepted Islam some two hundred years ago, during a great famine, when the Turks gave food to all who would profess the religion of the Prophet. A few of the neighbouring villages still remain Christian: their boast is that their ancestors refused Turkish bread as the price of conversion.

Most of the Pomak cottages I entered were dark and dirty. The people, especially the women, were ignorant, dirty, and not too friendly, though the children eagerly sought and ate sweets.

Trakitsi or Thracians inhabit parts of Southern Bulgaria; in others dwell Macedonians—now, as always, a mixture. Many of the peasants in the south near the Greek border, in the villages round Petritch, are Bulgarian Macedonians who have been repatriated from Greece in exchange for Greek Macedonians, after the rectification of the Greek-Bulgar frontier in 1926. These villages round Petritch, mostly new, are composed of ordinary little houses, built at that time for the exchanged populations. They are one or two storeys high, consist of one or more rooms and a kitchen, with a small garden in which are the outbuildings.

A somewhat similar exchange of population has been made in the north with Rumania after 1919, although round Vidin many Vlah families, and indeed whole Vlah villages, still remain within the borders of Bulgaria. The mother-tongue of these peasants, who are generally herdsmen, is a Rumanian dialect, but at the special schools now arranged for them the children learn to speak Bulgarian and to consider themselves Bulgars. In some of the villages along the Danube peasants from the Dobrudja have settled, sometimes in villages of their own, sometimes in

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[1] The exact population of Bulgaria according to the latest census is 6,171,300. This is made up of—

Bulgars (Orthodox)	4,555,355
Pomaks (Moslem Bulgars)	102,351
Turks	577,552
Rumanians	69,080
Jews	46,558
Russians	19,706
Others (including gipsies and Armenians, etc.)	800,698
Total	6,171,300

large blocks of an older village. Dobrudja people have also made homes in this manner in other districts, some even round Shumen, which is a strongly Moslem and Turkish town.

II

The Bulgars, on the whole, are agricultural, and the land is divided into small plots among the peasant proprietors.[1] In some districts the larger farms or estates (*chifliki*) are worked on a half-and-half basis, similar to *métayer* tenure. This system, whereby the peasant working the land receives half the produce and no wages, the owner taking the other half, has held sway in most parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The Bulgars are great gardeners, many of them working their gardens intensively. The peasants—men, women, and children—work hard, cultivating their hedgeless fields of wheat, maize, cabbages, and other crops, tending their enclosed vineyards, growing, in the south, cotton (which they prepare, spin, and weave themselves), as well as tobacco, opium poppies, and rice. Sunflowers, which are prized for their oil and seeds, are common everywhere, being grown either in plots or scattered amongst the other crops. In Central Bulgaria, in the Valley of Roses, between the Stara Planina or Balkan Mountains and the Sredna Gora, the oil of the flowers is extracted and refined into attar of roses, to be used at home as well as exported. The rose factories employ numbers of the inhabitants, who, during the rose season of May to June, work in shifts throughout a twenty-four hours' day. These factories generally belong to a kind of co-operative society including all the most important householders of the neighbourhood, and connected with a bank. When the attar of roses is sold, each member receives a share of the profits. Tobacco, on the other hand, is cultivated mostly by family labour; the leaves are picked in autumn, strung to dry on the house walls or in specially constructed drying-sheds, sorted, and baled and sold to the factories.

Bulgarian peasant families, like those of Jugoslavia, are generally self-supporting, and live off their own land, owning a few sheep, cows, goats, pigs, oxen or water-buffalo, horses or donkeys, and poultry. They purchase only such things as coffee, to flavour the home-roasted wheat or barley substitute, sugar (when honey is not used), paraffin,[1] salt, soda, and shoes. Soap is usually made at home with soda and the fat of their own sheep or cows; candles also are shaped from the wax of the bees kept by most peasant families. Women dry herbs, smoke meat and fat bacon, put down cabbage-heads in great vats of salt and water for winter use, make beautiful jam (*slatko*), much used in hospitality, as well as the sugarless *pekmez* for ordinary consumption.

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[1] Official figures give 79 per cent of the population possessing these agricultural smallholdings.

The men preside over wine-making and the distillation of spirit (*rakien*) from many different fruits. Some peasants are millers, receiving in payment a percentage of the grain taken to be ground; others are butchers, dyers, or keep the general shop of the village. Many of their sons, after finishing the requisite number of years at school, are apprenticed to various trades in the towns, while others continue their studies, and become priests, doctors, lawyers, or teachers. Some, again, return to their village to work on their land. Girls, too, nowadays generally go to school, some qualifying for the professions of teaching, medicine, and so on; but the rule is for all to marry, whether they carry on a profession or not. There are no "surplus women" in Bulgaria.

III

Bulgarian villages are often quite large, numbering hundreds of houses and thousands of inhabitants. They are organized under a *kmet* (village mayor), who is linked up through various town officials with the Ministry of the Interior. This *kmet*—sometimes a Sofia lawyer, sometimes an intelligent villager—works with his assistants in an office in the village. He settles the affairs of the peasants, like their military service or work in a labour corps, questions concerning schools, death certificates,[2] taxation, the settlement of quarrels, and so on; apparently nothing in a village can happen without the *kmet*.

The houses are built of sun-baked mud bricks, covered with a plaster of mud and cow-dung mixed with chaff, which, when dry, is white- or colour-washed inside and out, blue being a favourite tint. In the village of Kestritch or Tzarevo, near Varna, every cottage is painted blue, both woodwork and plaster. Pink and yellow seem to be more popular than white, while the green, pink, or lemon walls of some modern houses in villages in the neighbourhood of Vidin are decorated with stencilled patterns, coloured hunting scenes, or pictures of horses, elephants, or camels. Turrets and gables, verandahs and ornamental steps, also adorn the homes of these rich peasants or officials.

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[1] But nowadays more and more electric light is used, especially in villages near towns, or near the central electric station in the mountains.

[2] Burial usually takes place twenty-four hours after death. In towns the signature of a doctor is necessary. In villages the *kmet* signs the death certificate. Without this, burial may be postponed for two or three days.

The living rooms, where the animals often stray, may be built above the cowstalls, with an open-sided verandah-room, into which the other two or three rooms open, and are reached by an outside ladder-stairway. Living rooms are sometimes built alongside the stables and cowsheds. Both types of houses are relics of the time when a man's beasts were safe only when under his direct observation.

The roofs of these larger and newer houses are tiled; smaller cottages may be tiled, too, though they are more often inadequately thatched with grass, rye, or wheat straw, held in place by long "bean sticks."

The "village villas" resemble those of towns, and, like them, are furnished with tables, chairs, and beds. But the poorer peasant still sits on a low wooden home-made stool round the *sofra* (a low, round, wooden table about fifteen inches high), and eats out of a common dish, at night spreading his sheepskins or his woven reed or maize mats on the ground, the whole family often sleeping in the same room. In the Vidin villages, however, these rugs are laid on a raised wooden platform that fills one-half or one-third of the room; on this the loom also stands. The ordinary wooden or iron bedstead, with gaudy pictures painted at head and foot, is common, having wire springs, or merely planks. Or the whole bed may be of boards very roughly put together at home and strewn with sheepskins or other coverings.

Fence, hedge, or palings surround both house and farmyard or garden, as well as the usual outbuildings.

Of course, in the villages all water must be fetched by the women from the nearest well or fountain. The Institutes of Hygiene now offer baths to the school children. But Bulgarian peasants are not yet really fond of washing. In many districts they told me that they wash only their hands and face, but once a week put on clean linen. In the morning, and sometimes before and after meals, water is poured over the hands by a woman of the house. In winter, they say, it is too cold to have a bath. In summer, however, both men and women bathe in the sea or rivers.

Peasant men are generally shaved once a week, townsmen two or three times a week, because they believe that if they shave every day their skin will be spoilt. Certainly razors are not specially good, and safety-razors are rare.

IV

Of recent years great improvements have been made in public health. Most of the large towns now possess, in addition to the hospital, state-controlled institutes of hygiene (originally started and financed by the Rockefeller Foundation), consisting of various departments, laboratories, and clinics. These institutes have branches in smaller towns, and dispensaries, sometimes with a resident doctor and nurse,[1] in many of the larger villages. Some villages even have veterinary surgeons for their beasts. But in remote regions old women still practise the art of healing, gathering herbs before dawn or in their correct season, drying and preserving them according to old recipe or ancient ritual. Sometimes I found only as substitute-doctor a man (*feldsherski*) who during the war had had some training as a sergeant in the Bulgarian or German R.A.M.C. He cups, gives injections, or advice in minor ailments, but sends serious cases to a qualified doctor in the nearest town.

Child welfare clinics have also been started in certain towns. I visited one in Varna, which was served by a woman doctor, helped by one or two nurses. I also accompanied them to some of the neighbouring villages, which are visited at stated intervals.

In many of the larger villages one or more midwives practise, generally working on their own without a doctor. They are important people, and on *Babinden* or Midwives' Day (January 20th, N.S.) are visited by their former patients, bringing presents. Much feasting takes place, and curious old fertility rites are performed, with dancing of the *horo* or national dance.[2]

Official figures for the urban population of the whole country for the year 1934 give the principal causes of death as (1) tuberculosis in all forms, 13 per cent; (2) diseases of the circulatory system, 12·8 per cent; (3) pneumonia, 11·9 per cent; (4) deaths in early infancy, 7·7 per cent; (5) diarrhoea and enteritis, 7·0 per cent; (6) senility, 7·0 per cent; and (7) cancer, 5·4 per cent.

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[1] Nurses are still, however, rather inadequately trained, nor do they yet reach our standards.

[2] A full account of these ceremonies will appear elsewhere.

Each year sees improvements or new ventures in public health. I cite one or two examples which came under my own notice. In the south round Petritch, towards the Greek frontier, until lately ravaged by malaria, the recent work to stamp out this affliction is being intensified: swamps are drained—to become fields of wheat, cotton, and other crops; rivers are diverted, their beds straightened and cleaned, to disperse stagnant water, and so destroy breeding places and conditions favourable to the larvae of the *anemopheles* mosquito.

One of the doctors told me of the malaria statistics collected by the Petritch Institute, where children from six months to six years, and those of school age (seven to fourteen years), have been examined once or twice a week since 1928. According to him, a large proportion of the population at that time suffered from malaria in one form or another; but since the adoption of these anti-malarial measures (including free distribution of quinine) the incidence of infection has fallen considerably. On the other hand, in the two control villages where no preventive measures were employed the decrease has been less.

Round Shumen, in North-East Bulgaria, special attention is paid to water supply, refuse, and excreta disposal. Many new and improved pumps, fountains (consisting of an upright standard with a spout of constantly flowing water) have been erected, and wells dug. Attention has also been paid to the sanitation of the houses. Better closets[1] with wooden or brick sides, and holes in concrete, instead of board floors, are replacing the broken-sided reed or straw shelters so often set up by the peasants in their farmyards, while in schools[2] these concrete closets are now the rule.

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[1] Except in the better houses, and hotels of large towns, outside closets are the rule; these are almost invariably built on the old Turkish principle of a shelter with a hole in the floor, generally over a deep pit.

[2] Many of the large villages possess, besides the elementary school attended by children from seven to fourteen years, a *progimnazia* or first high school, with four classes. All children must spend at least a year in each class before a remove into a higher class is possible; this remove happens only at the beginning of the school year. The *gimnazia* or second high school has eight classes (the first four corresponding to the four of the *progimnazia*), so taking at least eight years of a pupil's life; they are built in large towns only.

PART II

I

These notes on the lives of the Bulgarian peasants serve as a background for the information given in the following tables of infant and maternal mortality and size of family. They have been compiled from random samples of family histories obtained in certain villages in different districts of Bulgaria, except for Table VII, which was taken from official Bulgarian records.

Most of the genealogies were personally collected in the villages, where travel conditions were often rough and "primitive." Sometimes I had to collect data under difficulties, standing at cottage doors, or sitting on low stools in the farmyard with the family (which frequently included pigs and goats) interestedly lounging around, in the *kafena* or inn from the village elders, who were excited in comparing grandfathers with great numbers of descendants. Dates and exact ages of people, especially of women, were often hard to come by, and had to be calculated by village or family events, like deaths, or the woman's age at bridal, or the year of a great flood, and so on.

I have for the sake of accuracy and simplicity divided my material into three groups: (A) completed families, in which the mothers were born between 1800 and 1886; (B) almost completed families, in which the mothers were born between 1887 and 1892; and (C) incomplete families, where the mothers were born in 1893 and after (Tables I, II, and III respectively).

These dates (as in my Jugoslav family histories) are fixed by the date of the mother's birth; when this is not known, that of the father has been used. I have included in these tables only those families of which all details about the offspring are known, rejecting those pedigrees in which the information is incomplete. This makes for greater accuracy, though naturally decreasing the number of families to be considered.

In these tables the infant mortality is calculated on the total number of births; maternal mortality is based on the total number of deliveries, i.e. twins, triplets, and quadruplets count as one birth. In the tables both the total births and the total deliveries are given; and Table VI gives details of the number of twins, triplets, and quadruplets.

Separate figures have been given for all families in the various villages, but calculations of infant or maternal mortality and size of family have been made only for all the families of each group A, B, and C. Infant deaths are reckoned per thousand full-term births, including live and still births; miscarriages and abortions have been omitted. It seems very probable that in many of the completed families all the still-births are not recorded; some of the earlier cases have most likely been forgotten. All the children now alive and still under the age of one year have been excluded when calculating infant mortality. But from the pedigrees it was not possible to ascertain the exact numbers of all children who had died less than a year old in the year of investigation. This applies particularly to the incomplete families of group C, where the mothers were born in 1893 and onwards. The limits are therefore given between which the infant mortality in this group must lie. The size of family has, however, been reckoned on all the children born, including those that died under a year in the year of investigation, as in my Jugoslav tables.

I have here, as in the Jugoslav figures, used the term "married women," and not "mothers," because in most cases the women were eventually married, though in many Bulgarian villages illegitimate children are not uncommon. Marriages are often concluded after a girl is pregnant, sometimes after the birth of one or more children. In some villages, however, the custom still persists of drinking *blaga rakien* or spirit sweetened with honey or sugar, with great rejoicing, when the bride is a virgin; if she is not, she may still be sent home for a time, sometimes till after the baby's birth. The old custom of harnessing a non-virgin bride like a horse, and dipping her in the river to wash away the stain, then stabling her for several hours before she is admitted to the house again, has now passed away. I have heard that this old custom was observed so recently as fourteen or fifteen years ago.

Early marriages are the rule, and unmarried peasant women are rare. In the Gagu village of Tzarevo or Kestritch, near Varna, a girl who remains unwed to the age of twenty-one or twenty-two is too old for any but a widower.

The maternal mortality has been calculated for all villages of the three groups A, B, and C together, although it is very possible that some cases of deaths in childhood have been missed, the death-rate being so low. No local records of deaths of women in childbirth appear to be kept.

II

Tables I to III give, in column 1, the names of the towns for each of the three groups A, B, and C. Column 2 notes the race and religion of the families in the group; column 3 the total number of married women (fertile marriages only); and column 4 the numbers of children born (see above). Column 5 shows the total deaths of infants aged 0 to 1 year; column 6 the total number of deliveries.

To consider infant mortality first, Table I gives particulars of the completed families of Group A, where the mothers were born 1800–86. Here (*a*) amongst the Pomaks or Moslem Bulgars, and the non-Bulgar families of the Vlahs and Gagus, taken together, the infant mortality is 322, and (*b*) amongst the Orthodox Bulgarian families of all the villages together the infant death-rate is lower, being 176 per thousand. When both these are taken together, the infant mortality is 187, calculated on a total number of 2,879 births.

Table II gives details of the almost completed families of Group B, where the mothers were born between the years 1887 and 1892. Here amongst the Orthodox Bulgars the infant mortality is 133. The number of Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus is too small for separate calculation. When their numbers are reckoned with those of the Orthodox Bulgars, the infant death-rate becomes 138, based on 790 births.

Table III gives particulars of the incomplete families of Group C, where the mothers were born in 1893 and later. Again in this group, as in Group A, the infant mortality among the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus is higher than among the Orthodox Bulgars, being between 149–158 and 144–150 respectively. But when all of them are considered together, the infant deaths are between 144–151 per thousand, based on 3,460 births.

There has been a fall in the infant death-rate, and it is, therefore, strange to find that the infant mortality in Group B, the middle one in point of time, should be lower than that found in Group C. But the numbers in Group B are much smaller than those of either of the other two groups, and this will make a difference.

TABLE I

(A) INFANT MORTALITY IN CERTAIN VILLAGES IN BULGARIA

(*Completed Families: Mothers Born 1800–86*)

District Nearest Town*	Race and Religion	Total Married Women (with Children)	Total Children	Number of Children Died 0–1 Years	Total Deliveries
(*a*) Plovdiv (Philippopolis)	Pomaks: Moslem Bulgars	5	33	10	33
Varna	Gagu: Orthodox Turks	18	127	28	127
Vidian	Vlah: Orthodox Rumanian speaking	11	70	36	70
Total (Pomaks, Vlahs, Gagus)		34	230	74	230
(*b*) Petritch	Orthodox Bulgars	11	85	23	85
Sofia	Orthodox Bulgars (Shopi)	11	99	25	98
Berkovitza	Orthodox Bulgars	10	60	12	60
Belogradchik	Orthodox Bulgars	42	254	26	253
Veliko Trnovo	Orthodox Bulgars	68	364	46	363
Shumen	Orthodox Bulgars	72	449	100	444
Vratza	Orthodox Bulgars	4	26	2	26
Varna	Orthodox Bulgars	67	456	115	447
Plovdiv (Philippopolis)	Orthodox Bulgars	136	856	116	845
Total (Orthodox Bulgars)		421	2,649	465	2,621
Total (*a*) and (*b*)		455	2,879	539	2,851

Infantile mortality (with standard error)	Group (*a*)	322 ± 31
	Group (*b*)	176 ± 7
	All	187 ± 7
Average size of family	Group (*a*)	6·8
	Group (*b*)	6·3
	All	6·3

* For the names of the villages situated near these towns see Note to Tables I, II, III.

Table II

(B) INFANT MORTALITY IN CERTAIN VILLAGES IN BULGARIA

(Almost Completed Families : Mothers Born 1887–1893)

District Nearest Town*	Race and Religion	Total Married Women (with Children)	Total Children	Number of Children Died 0–1 Years	Total Deliveries
(*a*) Plovdiv (Philippopolis)	Pomaks: Moslem Bulgars	3	10	2	10
Varna	Gagu: Orthodox Turks	13	52	10	51
Vidian	Vlah: Orthodox Rumanian speaking	2	12	2	12
Total (Pomaks, Gagus, Vlahs)		18	74	14	73
(*b*) Petritch	Orthodox Bulgars	3	24	3	24
Sofia	Orthodox Bulgars (Shopi)	3	17	4	17
Berkovitza	Orthodox Bulgars	2	8	2	8
Belogradchik	Orthodox Bulgars	13	48	8	48
Veliko Trnovo	Orthodox Bulgars	37	102	9	101
Shumen	Orthodox Bulgars	25	122	17	121
Vratza	Orthodox Bulgars	4	21	3	20
Varna	Orthodox Bulgars	35	167	34	166
Plovdiv (Philippopolis)	Orthodox Bulgars	51	207	15	204
Total (Orthodox Bulgars)		173	716	95	709
Total (*a*) and (*b*)		191	790	109	782

Infantile mortality (with standard error)	Group (*b*)	133 ± 13
	All	138 ± 12
Average size of family	Group (*a*)	4·1
	Group (*b*)	4·1
	All	4·1

* For the names of the villages situated near these towns see Note to Tables I, II, III.

(C) INFANT MORTALITY IN CERTAIN VILLAGES IN BULGARIA

(*Incomplete Families : Mothers Born 1893 and Later*)

District Nearest Town*	Race and Religion	Total Married Women (with Children)	Total Children	Number of Children Died 0–1 Years	Total Deliveries
(*a*) Plovdiv (Philippopolis)	Pomaks: Moslem Bulgars	24	78	14	80
Varna	Gagu: Orthodox Turks	79	167	28	182
Vidian	Vlah: Orthodox Rumanian speaking	48	90	11	91
Total (Pomaks, Gagus, Vlahs)		151	335	53	353
(*b*) Petritch	Orthodox Bulgars	32	107	32	117
Sofia	Orthodox Bulgars	45	148	30	152
Berkovitza	Orthodox Bulgars	34	124	12	130
Belogradchik	Orthodox Bulgars	127	278	23	287
Veliko Trnovo	Orthodox Bulgars	152	290	30	297
Shumen	Orthodox Bulgars	224	510	88	524
Vratza	Orthodox Bulgars	25	78	14	25
Varna	Orthodox Bulgars	221	708	117	734
Plovdiv (Philippopolis)	Orthodox Bulgars	359	882	115	911
Total (Orthodox Bulgars)		1,219	3,125	469	3,177
Total (*a*) and (*b*)		1,370	3,460	522	3,530

Infantile mortality (with standard error)	Group (*a*)	158 ± 20 to 149 ± 19
	Group (*b*)	150 ± 6 to 144 ± 6
	All	151 ± 6 to 144 ± 6
Average size of family†	Group (*a*)	2·4
	Group (*b*)	2·7
	All	2·6

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* For the names of the villages situated near these towns see Note to Tables I, II, III.

† The "Total Children" excludes all those born within the year (1935–36) of the investigation. The "Average size of family," however, includes these.

Note on Tables I, II, III

VILLAGES FROM WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED

(*a*)

District	*Village*
Plovdiv	Korovo
Varna	Tzarevo or Kestritch
Vidian	Slanotrn

(*b*)

District:	*Villages:*					
Petritch	Leshnitza Toplinitza	Chuchilignovo Kolarivo	Kulota Karanov	Marinpolye	Kernalo	Shibanov
Sofia	Kladnitza	Vladaiya	Kralyevodol			
Berkovitza	Klisura	Chifluk	Slatina	Zagorigrad		
Belogradchik	Aleksandrovo Chupanye	Bela Protopopintze	Donya Lom Trgovishta	Gonya Lom Staiftche	Gonya Chifluk Replinye	Donya Chifluk Borvishta
Veliko Trnovo	Volov Dividedovo	Debelitch	Samovodna	Belyaikovitza	Albanese	Prisovo
Shumen	Maresh Dibitch	Vehten Belokapeto	Mitropolit Simion Makek	Tzarivobrod	Zlokutchen	Volov
Vratza	Bistritz					
Varna	Topoli	Konstantinovo	Vladislavovo	Nadjezhda	Novo Gradatz	
Plovdiv	Kumanitza	Batchkovo	Kominitza	Perushitza	Koritchen	

Some of these villages have been recently established for the Bulgarian families from Greece, which were exchanged for Greek families living in Bulgaria, after the rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier in 1926.

Table IV gives the infant mortality when the completed families of group A and the almost completed families of group B are combined with each other, and also with the incomplete families of group C. When all the families of groups A and B, irrespective of race or religion, are combined together, the infant mortality is 177, based on 3,669 births; and when the three groups A, B, and C, irrespective of race or religion, are combined, the infant death-rate is between 161–164, and the total number of births 7,129–7,284. This is not significantly higher than that of the Orthodox Bulgarian families only, in which, for groups A and B, the infant mortality is 166, and for all three groups 155–159, based on a total of 3,365 and 6,490–6,625 respectively. While for the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus of groups A and B together the infant deaths are 289 per thousand, and for the three groups together 214–221, based on a total of 304 births in groups A and B, and 639–659 in groups A, B, and C.

TABLE IV

INFANT MORTALITY IN CERTAIN VILLAGES IN BULGARIA, WHEN THE COMPLETED FAMILIES OF GROUP A, THE ALMOST COMPLETED FAMILIES OF GROUP B, AND THE INCOMPLETE FAMILIES OF GROUP C ARE COMBINED

Groups	Race and Religion	Total Children	Total Numbers of Children Died 0–1 Year	Infant Mortality with Standard Error
A + B	All races and religions	3,669	648	177 ± 6
A + B + C* ..	All races and religions	7,129 to 7,284	1,170	164 ± 4 to 161 ± 4
A + B	Orthodox Bulgars	3,365	560	166 ± 6
A + B + C* ..	Orthodox Bulgars	6,490 to 6,625	1,029	159 ± 5 to 155 ± 4
A + B	Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus	304	88	289 ± 26
A + B + C* ..	Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus	639 to 659	141	221 ± 16 to 214 ± 16

* See footnote (†) to Table III.

Table V gives the maternal mortality per full-term live- and still-births for the completed, almost completed, and incomplete families of the groups A, B, and C. The families of the three

TABLE V

MATERNAL MORTALITY FIGURES FOR CERTAIN VILLAGES IN BULGARIA

All Villages	Race and Religion	Total Deliveries	Total Deaths of Married Women in Childbirth	Doubtful Cases of Deaths in Childbirth	Maternal Mortality (per 1,000 Full-Term Live and Still-Births)	Maternal Mortality, including Doubtful Cases
Group A	All races and religions	2,851	3	—	1·1	—
Group B (see Table II) ..	All races and religions	782	—	—	—	—
Group C (see Table III) ..	All races and religions	3,530	11	1	3·1	3·4
Totals of A + B + C ..	All races and religions	7,163	14	1	2·0	2·1
Group A	Orthodox Bulgars	2,621	3	—	1·1	—
Group B	Orthodox Bulgars	709	—	—	—	—
Group C	Orthodox Bulgars	3,177	9	1	2·8	3·2
Totals of A + B + C ..	Orthodox Bulgars	6,507	12	1	1·8	2·0
Groups A + C	All races and religions	6,381	14	1	2·2	2·4
Groups A + C	Orthodox Bulgars	5,798	12	1	2·1	2·3

* The numbers of women and children are the same, and belong to the same villages, as those in Tables I to III.

groups, irrespective of their race or religion (columns 1 and 2), have also been taken together. This brings the number of deliveries of all peasant women of these three groups to a total of 7,163 (column 3); and the number of married women dying in childbirth to 14 (+ 1 doubtful case) (columns 4 and 5). The maternal mortality is 2·0 per thousand, or 2·1 if the doubtful case is included (columns 6 and 7). Calculations are also given for all Orthodox Bulgarian women of the three groups—a total of 6,507 deliveries, and 12 (+ 1 doubtful case) of women dying in childbirth, making a maternal death-rate of 1·8 per thousand, or 2·0 with the doubtful case.

Tables I to III also show the average size of family for each of the groups A, B, and C, for Orthodox Bulgars, and for the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus, both divisions separately and combined. This is, however, based on fertile marriages only, because, the tables being designed originally to discuss infant and maternal mortality, childless marriages are omitted as a matter of course;[1] and, as is mentioned above, the calculation of size of family has been made on all children, including those alive (or dead) under the age of one year at the time of the investigation, as was also done in the Jugoslav families.

Among the completed Orthodox Bulgarian families of group A the average size of family is 6·3, while among the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus the figure is 6·8 (Table I). This gives each married couple an average of 6·3 children when the two sets are combined. When Orthodox Bulgars are combined with the others, 4·1 is the figure for the almost completed families of group B. Among the incomplete families of group C the average size of an Orthodox Bulgarian family is 2·7, and that of the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus 2·4.

Table VI gives the numbers of twins, triplets, and quadruplets born in the three groups A, B, and C. In this table only the names of the towns near which the villages are situated are given; for the names of the villages see Note to Tables I–III. When the total number of twins for all races and religions in all three groups is taken together, 0·8 per cent twin births and 0·9 per cent multiple births are recorded. This percentage is lower than that found among the Jugoslav families I investigated.[2]

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[1] Fuller details of size of family in Bulgarian villages will, it is hoped, be published later.

[2] See my article in *Population*, Vol. II, No. 1, November 1935.

I give, in Table VII, the official Bulgarian figures for the infant mortality of the whole country, taken from the printed records.

TABLE VI

TOTAL SETS OF TWINS, TRIPLETS, AND QUADRUPLETS OCCURRING IN THE SAME FAMILIES IN BULGARIAN VILLAGES FOR ALL THE COMPLETED FAMILIES OF GROUP A, ALL THE ALMOST COMPLETED FAMILIES OF GROUP B, AND ALL THE INCOMPLETE FAMILIES OF GROUP C, IRRESPECTIVE OF RACE OR RELIGIONS

Towns near which Villages are Situated	Group A: Completed Families	Group B: Almost Completed Families	Group C: Incomplete Families
Sofia	1	—	—
Belogradchik	1	—	2
Veliko Trnovo ..	1	1	2
Shumen	5	1	5
Varna (*b*)	4 + 1 (triplets) + 1 (quadruplets)*	1	6
Vratza	—	1	—
Plovdiv (*b*) (Philippopolis)	11*	3	9
Varna (*a*)	—	1	1 (triplets)
Petritch	—	—	3
Berkovitza	—	—	1
Totals	23 + 1 (triplets) + 1 (quadruplets)	8	28 + 1 (triplets)

Total multiple births ..	62	Total twin births	59
Percentage of total births ..	0·87	Percentage of total births ..	0·8

* Of these, 3 sets of twins + 1 set of triplets + 1 set of quadruplets were born to one Bulgarian woman in a village near Varna; and 5 sets of twins to another in one of the Plovdiv villages.

TABLE VII

OFFICIAL FIGURES OF INFANT MORTALITY (PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS) FOR THE WHOLE OF BULGARIA

	1926–30	1930–34	1934
General population	147·1	142·9	129·6
Rural population	147·5	145·2	130·3
Urban population	144·7	135·1	125·6

These calculations have been made per thousand live births, for the years 1926–30, 1930–34, and for 1934, for the population as a whole, as well as separately for rural and urban districts. In them the infant death-rate is seen always to be lowest in towns, being 144·7, 135·1, and 125·6; and highest in villages, viz. 147·5, 145·2, and 130·3 respectively for the same series of years; while for the whole country the rate is 147·1, 142·9, and 129·6. These figures show that infant deaths are decreasing.

Other official figures for the years 1926–34, taken from the records kept by the Malaria Institute of Petritch in South Bulgaria, for the whole Petritch district (*okolona*), comprising many villages and several small towns with a population averaging 35,000 persons, give an infant death-rate of 150 per thousand, based on a total of 8,889 births. These Petritch figures are most nearly comparable with those of the incomplete families of my group C, where, in the Orthodox Bulgarian families, the infant mortality of 144–150 is practically the same as the Petritch figures, though these latter include urban as well as rural populations. This is, however, what would be expected, for, as is seen in the official figures for the whole country, the infant mortality in towns is lower than in villages; while against this must be set the known malarial infection of the Petritch district, where infant deaths are also tending to decrease. But this comparison of the infant death-rate based on all the births in one district with that from the random sample families of groups A, B, and C, from villages in many regions, is interesting.

Conclusions.—(1) The infant mortality among the peasant families in Bulgaria, irrespective of their race or religion, is highest in the completed families of group A, and lowest in the almost completed families of group B; but these latter calculations have been made on much smaller numbers. Among the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus, however, the infant death-rate is considerably higher than among the Orthodox Bulgars, both in group A and among the incomplete families of group C, although in group C the difference is not so great. (2) When all the families in groups A and B are combined, the infant death-rate among the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus is also greater than that of the Orthodox Bulgars. The same is true when the families of all three groups are combined. (3) The infant mortality (according to the official figures published for the years 1926–34) is higher in rural than in urban districts. This is, however, what would be expected, because village conditions are always rougher than in towns, and in former times possessed fewer facilities to combat the epidemics, and still are less well equipped than towns. Again, among the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus yet more "primitive" conditions prevail, especially amongst the Moslem Pomaks, who, in addition, appear to have little regard for the restrictions of public health, combined with a fatalistic creed. This higher infant mortality may also be due to a decrease, within the last twenty-five years, of deaths among the Christian peasants of group C. It must, however, be remembered that the families of group C are incomplete, with an excess of earlier-born children, so that if the death-rate of later-born children is higher, this would account for the decrease. On the other hand, if deaths are more frequent among the first-born, this would operate in the opposite direction. (4) The difference between the size of family of the Pomaks, Vlahs, and Gagus and the Orthodox Bulgars is not great; in general, families tend to become smaller, judging by the size of families in group C, in which families are practically completed. (5) The difference between the maternal mortality of the completed and incomplete families of the groups A and C, irrespective of their race or religion, is very slight, being 2·0 and 1·8 respectively, or 2·1 and 2·0 if the doubtful cases are included. Fewer maternal deaths, however, occur among the Orthodox Bulgars. But these figures of deaths in childbirth are low, even for a hardy peasant people, who have a hard environment to contend with, few of the modern aids of the social services, and a comparatively high infant mortality.

DIE AUSWANDERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN JUDEN SEIT 1933

(*THE EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWS SINCE 1933*)

Von DR. KURT ZIELENZIGER, *Amsterdam*

ALLE Wanderungsbewegungen als Massenerscheinungen haben wirtschaftliche oder politische Ursachen. Es müssen schwerwiegende Momente vorliegen, wenn ganze Volksteile oder Bevölkerungsgruppen veranlasst werden, ihre Heimat zu verlassen. Denn gegenüber der Abenteurerlust, die das Motiv für die Auswanderung eines einzelnen bildet, erfolgt die Auswanderung zahlreicher gleichgearteter Menschen oft unter Druck. Volks- und weltwirtschaftlich betrachtet sind diese Bevölkerungsverschiebungen von grösster Bedeutung, ebenso bilden sie ein wichtiges Moment für die Bevölkerungspolitik. Diese Wanderungen, durch die viele Länder neu erschlossen wurden, haben in der Geschichte der Menschheit nie aufgehört. Besonders der Weltkrieg hat aus politischen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen starke Veränderungen in der Bevölkerung mit sich gebracht. Noch jetzt beläuft sich die Zahl der Schützlinge, die das Internationale Nansen-Amt in Genf zu betreuen hat nach einer Angabe seines Leiters Michael Hansson auf ca. 600,000 Menschen: Russen, Armenier, Chaldäer, Assyrer Türken usw.[1]

Rein numerisch fällt gegenüber diesen grossen Zahlen die Auswanderung von noch nicht 150,000 Menschen nicht sehr ins Gewicht, auch dann nicht, wenn man diese Zahl der Auswanderer mit der Gesamtzahl der Bevölkerung des Landes vergleicht, aus dem die Auswanderer kommen: bei 67 Millionen spielen 150,000 = 0·23 pro Cent keine grosse Rolle. Und doch muss die *Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland* anders gewertet werden. Denn bei dieser Auswanderung sprechen die verschiedensten Momente mit, neben den politischen und wirtschaftlichen auch die seelischen. Die ursprünglich überstürzte Auswanderung hat längst einer überlegten und geregelten Platz gemacht, aber sie bleibt — und das ist ihr Charakteristikum — konstant. Sie wird von den führenden Persönlichkeiten des neuen Regimes in Deutschlands offiziell gewünscht und propagiert, unter Befolgung der Grundsätze, die bereits in dem von Gottfried Feder kommentierten.[2]

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[1] Vgl. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* v. 15. Sept. 1937, Blatt 2.

[2] *Programm der N.S.D.A.P.* (München 1931) niedergelegt waren: "Lästige Ausländer und Juden können abgeschoben werden." (Seite 35).

Die jährliche Zahl der jüdischen Auswanderer übersteigt oder gleicht immerhin den Zahlen der deutschen Auswanderer vor dem Kriege. Denn aus Deutschland wanderten im ganzen aus 1911: 22,690, 1912: 18,545, und 1913: 25,843 personen, die damals einzeln hinausgingen. Bei dem geringen Prozentsatz der jüdischen Bevölkerung an der deutschen Gesamtbevölkerung (im Jahre 1933 nur 0·8 pro Cent) fällt die Zahl der jüdischen Auswanderer anders ins Gewicht.

Die jüdische Geschichte ist eine Geschichte der ständigen Wanderungen. Die Zwangswanderungen übertreffen an Bedeutung die freiwilligen. Die Vertreibung der Juden aus Spanien führte auch den letzten Juden von der Pyrenäischen Halbinsel fort. Die Pogrome Russlands erzwangen zunächst nur die Abwanderung eines Teiles der jüdischen Bevölkerung von dort. Auch aus Deutschland sind vor 1933 Juden ausgewandert, besonders zahlreich von ungefähr 1840 bis 1870, aber allein aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen. Aus Bayern emigrierten in den Jahren 1840 bis 1852 über 10,000 Juden, aus Posen von 1835 bis 1852 19,000 Juden. Der Prozentsatz der Ausgewanderten im Verhältnis zum natürlichen Zuwachs betrug von 1843 bis 1871 in Preussen bei der Gesamtbevölkerung 8·7 pro Cent, bei den Juden aber 36 pro Cent. Die jüdische Bevölkerung hat also in diesem Zeitraum durch die Abwanderung viermal soviel Seelen eingebüsst wie die übrige Bevölkerung.[1] Diese jüdischen Auswanderer gingen meist nach Amerika als Pioniere. Aber diese Auswanderung deutscher Juden hörte nach 1870 fast völlig auf. Desto stärker wurde die Auswanderung von Ostjuden nach Amerika. Während der letzten 55 Jahre sind nach Michael Traub[2] über 3½ Millionen Juden aus Osteuropa ausgewandert. Auch diese Auswanderung in ihrem riesigen Umfange fällt numerisch gegenüber der Auswanderung der deutschen Juden aufs stärkste ins Gewicht.

Die Auswanderung der deutschen Juden lässt sich nur mit dem Auszug der Salzburger Protestanten im 18. und dem der französischen Hugenotten im 17. Jahrhundert vergleichen. Denn auch sie gingen aus ähnlichen Beweggründen vereinzelt und in grösseren Gruppen aus ihrer Heimat fort. So erfolgt die Abwanderung der

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[1] Vgl. Sucher B. Weinryb: "Der Kampf um die Berufsumschichtung," *Jüdische Lesehefte*, Nr. 13, Berlin 1936, Seite 30 ff. und Jakob Lestschinsky, *Das wirtschaftliche Schicksal des deutschen Judentums* (Berlin 1932), Seite 41 ff.

[2] *Die Jüdische Auswanderung aus Deutschland* (Berlin 1936), Seite 9/11.

Juden aus Deutschland zwar nicht in grossen Sammeltransporten — die Fahrt des Dampfers *Stuttgart* im Oktober 1936 nach Südafrika bildete eine Ausnahme — und sie erstreckt sich auch auf alle Länder der Welt, und doch muss man in dieser konstanten Auswanderung eine Massenerscheinung erblicken. Es handelt sich hier auch im Gegensatz zu der Auswanderung von Juden aus anderen Ländern um eine besonders qualifizierte Bevölkerungsgruppe, unter der sich vor allem zahlreiche tatkräftige Menschen im besten Alter und Männer befinden, die auf Grund ihrer bisherigen Stellung in ihrer Heimat auf den verschiedensten Gebieten erfolgreich gewirkt hatten: Gelehrte, Ärzte, Anwälte, Ingenieure, Künstler, Schriftsteller usw. Der Auszug so vieler qualitativ hochstehender Kräfte sollte für das Auswanderungsland doch einen Verlust bedeuten.

Die Auswanderung der deutschen Juden wurde bedingt durch die *planmässige Ausschaltung aus zahlreichen Berufen*, die sie bis zum Jahre 1933 in Deutschland eingenommen hatten. Das Berufsbeamtengesetz vom 7. April 1933 und das Gesetz über die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft vom gleichen Tage eröffnete die Periode der Gesetzgebung, die schliesslich in den sogenannten Nürnberger Gesetzen vom 15. September 1935 gipfelte. Alle diese Gesetze, Verordnungen und Erlasse führten zu einer immer stärkeren Verengung des Lebensraums der Juden in Deutschland, die noch durch ihre zielbewusste Ausschaltung aus der Wirtschaft selbst durch zahlreiche Massnahmen der Behörden und der Partei verstärkt wurde.

Die Aussichtslosigkeit, in Deutschland künftig noch irgendeine Beschäftigung zu finden, die die Existenz ermöglichen würde, führte naturnotwendig zur Auswanderung. Wenn sie auch, wie bereits betont, von den massgebenden Instanzen in Deutschland durch Wort und Schrift gefördert wird, so wird sie durch die bestehende Devisengesetzgebung natürlich erschwert.

So steht die Auswanderung der deutschen Juden unter einem starken politischen und wirtschaftlichen Druck. Hinzu kommen noch die durch die neue Politik bedingten seelischen Momente. Aber die Auswanderung wird erschwert durch die zahlreichen Hindernisse, die der Einwanderung in fast allen Ländern entgegenstehen. Mit Recht betont Arthur Prinz in seinem Artikel "Jüdische Wanderungpolitik heute und morgen": "Das Zeitalter des Liberalismus ist auch in der Wanderungspolitik vorüber."[1]

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[1] *Der Morgen*, Berlin, Nr. 2, Mai 1937.

Die Erde scheint verteilt zu sein und bietet neuen Wanderern nur wenig Raum.

Man kann annehmen, dass bis zum Ende des Jahres 1937 aus Deutschland *im ganzen* 135,000 *Juden seit dem Beginn des neuen Regimes ausgewandert* sind.

Diese Zahl beruht nicht ausschliesslich auf Erhebungen, die bei dieser Auswanderungsbewegung sich nicht restlos durchführen lassen, sondern auf Schätzungen, die sich aber auf einigermassen zuverlässiges Material stütgen. Der Preussische Landesverband Jüdischer Gemeinden hat im Juli 1936 eine *Meldestelle für Binnen- und Auswanderung* in Berlin ins Leben gerufen. Sie sollte: "dem Zustand ein Ende bereiten, dass über Umfang und Gliederung sowohl der jüdischen Binnenwanderung als auch der Auswanderung lediglich Schätzungen möglich waren, die zum Teil die verschiedenartigsten und sich keineswegs deckenden Quellen benutzen mussten." Von dieser Meldestelle werden jetzt regelmässig durch ihren Referenten Max Birnbaum in dem "Gemeindeblatt für die Jüdischen Gemeinden Preussens", Berlin Berichte über die Binnen und Auswanderung erstattet. Diese Zahlen werden aus einer Fühlungnahme, die sich jetzt auch auf die nichtpreussischen Landesverbände der Juden in Deutschland erstreckt, gewonnen.

Im ersten Quartal 1937 sind auf Grund der Berechnungen dieser Meldestelle fast 6,000 Juden aus Deutschland ausgewandert. In ihrem dritten Bericht für das Quartal Januar bis März 1937 wird die Zahl der Auswanderer mit 5,101 errechnet. Es wird aber betont, dass man unter Berücksichtigung der "unvermeidlichen Lücken jedes Meldewesens" eine Auswanderung von 6,000 Personen annehmen muss.[1] Birnbaum kommt zu dem Ergebnis, "dass, von Saison-Schwankungen abgesehen, mit einer sehr erheblichen gleichbleibenden Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland gerechnet werden kann." Diese Behauptung wird durch die Erhebungen für das 2. Quartal 1937 bestätigt. Es wurden in dieser Ziet 5,250 Auswanderungsfälle erfasst.[2]

Alle Erfahrungen der Fachleute und der zuständigen Organisationen, die sich mit der Auswanderung der deutschen Juden beschäftigen, sprechen dafür, dass die Auswanderung aus Deutschland im gleichen Masse fortschreitet. Sie ist natürlich von klimatischen und politischen Einflüssen abhängig, aber der Strom fliesst unverändert weiter. Nimmt man also die Zahl von 6,000

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[1] *Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt für die Synagogen-Gemeinden in Preussen und Norddeutschland*, Nr. 8, v. 1. Aug. 1937.

[2] Nr. 11, v. 1. Nov. 1937.

Auswanderern pro Quartal als grundlegend an, dann erhält man *für das Jahr insgesamt eine Zahl von* 24,000. Diese Zahl lässt sich auch aus der Analogie mit den Zahlen für 1936 gewinnen.

Die bereits genannte Meldestelle hat für das letzte Vierteljahr 1936 eine Gesamtauswanderung von rund 7,000 Juden errechnet. Sie betont, dass diese Erhebung damit die Schätzungen bestätigt, "die für 1936 mit einer Gesamtauswanderung von mindestens 24,000 Juden gerechnet haben." In den Monaten Oktober bis Dezember 1936 hatte die Meldestelle genau 5,261 Auswanderungen erfasst, aber sie konnte damals noch nicht alle Auswanderungsfälle berücksichtigen und ist deshalb zu der berechtigten Annahme der 7,000 Auswanderer gekommen.[1]

Die Zahl von 24,000 Auswanderern aus Deutschland wird auch in dem *Report on the Activities of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for the Year* 1936 angegeben (p. 16). In dem *Report for* 1936 des *Council for German Jewry* heisst es: "The estimated figures of those who left in 1936 with or without assistance are roughly 24,000, of whom 9,000 went to Palestine, 10,000 to other countries overseas, 1,500 to European countries for fresh settlement, and 3,800 were repatriated to European countries to which they belonged" (p. 7).

Diese Gesamtübersicht für 1936 enthält bereits eine Aufteilung der jüdischen Auswanderung auf einzelne grosse Wanderungsgebiete. Sie deckt sich im allgemeinen mit den übrigen Veröffentlichungen, die wohl auf authentischen Angaben von deutscher jüdischer Seite beruhen. Nur weicht hier die Zahl der Rückwanderer [repatriated] ab. Sie wird in der Bildstatistik des bereits erwähnten *Joint* mit 3,500 angegeben.

Wie die *Informationsblätter*, Nr. 7/9 (Juli/September 1936), herausgegeben von der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, mitteilen, hatte der Wanderungsausschuss der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland — der Spitzenorganisation aller deutsch-jüdischen Organisationen — eine Untersuchung über die Statistik der Auswanderung von Juden aus Deutschland gemeinsam mit dem Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland und dem Palästinaamt durchgeführt. "Das Ergebnis dieser Untersuchung stellt eine bei dem Fehlen völlig ausreichender exakter Unterlagen unter Berücksichtigung aller für die Wanderungsbewegung massgebenden Faktoren vorgenommene Schätzung dar. Zugrunde gelegt wurden hierbei für die Palästina-Wanderung die statistischen Veröffentlichungen der 'Jewish Agency,' für die Wanderung nach den übrigen Ländern die Zahl derjenigen Auswanderer, deren Wanderung mit Mitteln jüdischer Organisationen durchgeführt wurde. Dabei mussten die Zahlen derjenigen Auswanderer, die ohne Unterstützung der jüdischen Organisationen und daher auch ohne Registrierung ausgewandert sind, durch Schätzung ermittelt werden. Das Verhältnis der freien zur unterstützten Auswanderung wies in den letzten Jahren starke Schwankungen auf. Es kann angenommen werden, dass die freie Auswanderung mindestens ebenso gross wie die unterstützte Auswanderung gewesen ist, ja zeitweilig sogar das doppelte der unterstützten Auswanderung erreicht hatte." Auf Grund dieser Erhebungen liegen für die Zeit vom 1. Februar 1933 bis zum 1. April 1936 folgende genaue Zahlen vor:

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[1] *Gemeindeblatt* usw. Nr. 5, v. 1. Mai 1937.

Europa-Wanderung		
die 1933 nach Westeuropa Ausgewanderten sind auf zu schätzen, davon sind zurückgewandert nach		36,000
östlichen Ländern	3,000	
weitergewandert nach Palästina	3,000	
weitergewandert nach Uebersee	8,000	
		14,000
sodass insgesamt in westeuropäische Ländern verblieben sind		22,000
Diese 22,000 in Europa verbliebenen Auswanderer verteilen sich auf:		
Westeuropa (Belgien, England, Frankreich, Holland)	15,000	
Mittel- und Südosteuropa (Schweiz, Oesterreich, Italien, Tschechoslowakei, Jugoslawien)	3,000	
Nordische Länder	1,000	
Südwesteuropa (Spanien, Portugal)	2,000	
sonstige europäische Länder	400	
		22,000
Rückwanderung		
von Juden ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit in ihre Heimatländer, besonders nach Osteuropa (Polen, Randstaaten, Balkan)		18,000
Palästina-Wanderung		31,000
Uebersee-Wanderung		
Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika	9,500	
Brasilien	4,500	
Argentinien	2,500	
Chile	600	
übrige süd- und zentralamerikanische Länder	2,000	
sonstige überseeische Länder	400	
		22,000
		93,000

Diese Angaben sind auch von Dr. Michael Traub in seiner schon erwähnten Schrift *Die jüdische Auswanderung aus Deutschland* als massgebend angenommen worden. Für das zweite Quartal 1936 hat Traub dann eine Zahl von 4,800 jüdischen Auswanderern aus Deutschland errechnet, sodass er zu dem Schluss kommt, "dass die jüdische Gesamtauswanderung aus Deutschland in der Zeit vom 1. Februar 1933 bis 30. Juni 1936 über 98,000 in runden Zahlen ca. 100,000 Seelen betragen hat" (p. 21).

Die Meldestelle für Binnen- und Auswanderung hat nun in ihrem ersten Bericht für das Quartal Juli/September 1936 3,268 Personen als Auswanderer erfasst. Sie betont aber, und wohl mit Recht: "Diese Zahlen liegen auch unter Berücksichtigung der bisher von der Meldestelle noch nicht erfassten Gebiete zweifellos weit unter den tatsächlichen Ergebnissen. Die Differenz ist unter anderem darauf zurückzuführen, dass im Berichtsquartal eine starke Palästina-Auswanderung vorgelegen hat, die direkt von den Hachschara-Stätten[1] ins Ausland gegangen ist." Die tatsächliche Auswanderung war in diesem Quartal also viel höher. Die Fehlerquellen sind dann bei der Berechnung der Auswanderung für das ganze Jahr 1936 entsprechend berücksichtigt worden. Zu den 93,000 Auswanderern, die bis zum 1. April 1936 gezählt waren, kommen also ungefähr 18,000 Auswanderer für die Zeit vom 1. April bis zum 31. Dezember 1936 hinzu. *Die Gesamtauswanderung deutscher Juden hätte somit Ende* 1936 111,000 *Köpfe betragen.* Diese Berechnung deckt sich ungefähr genau mit der des *Joint,* der in seinem bereits erwähnten Report erklärt: "In the four years, however, 112,000 Jews had emigrated" (p. 16). Der Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland, die Organisation, die jetzt für die Förderung der Auswanderung deutscher Juden nach allen Ländern mit Ausnahme Palästinas zuständig und die vom Reichswanderungsamt als Auswandererberatungsstelle ausdrücklich anerkannt ist, gibt in einem Merkblatt, das zu Beginn des Jahres 1937 erschienen ist, die Zahl der Auswanderer aus Deutschland mit 115,000 an. Von ihnen gingen 45,000 nach Übersee, 30,000 nach europäischen Ländern und 40,000 nach Palästina. Unsere Berechnung, die von der Mindestziffer ausgeht, deckt sich also ungefähr mit den Berechnungen der beiden massgebenden Organisationen. Legt man diese Abschlusszahlen für 1936 der Berechnung der Auswanderungsziffern für 1937 zugrunde, in der

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[1] Ausbildungsstätten der Jugendlichen in Handwerk und Landwirtschaft für die Palästina-Auswanderung. *D. Verf.*

Annahme, dass die Auswanderung der deutschen Juden auch in diesem Jahre ebenso hoch geblieben ist wie 1936, dann kommt man zu dem Schluss, dass *bis zum Ende des Jahres* 1937 *unter* gleichbleibenden Verhältnissen *aus Deutschland im ganzen* 135,000 *Juden ausgewandert sind.*

Wie stark diese Auswanderung fortschreitet, kann man aus einem Vergleich mit den Ziffern vom Ende des Jahres 1935 ersehen, die in dem berühmten *Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees* (*Jewish and Other*) *Coming from Germany*, zitiert sind. In dem Chapter IV des "Annex" heisst es: "Yet, despite the conditions, over 80,000 individuals have emigrated. . . . 15 to 20 per cent are non-Jewish by confession and forced to leave Germany either because of their ideas or because they have been defined as 'non-Aryans' according to the racial formula, though they may be Christians." Wohin der Weg ursprünglich diese Auswanderer führte, sagt McDonald auch, wenn er erklärt: "The majority originally took refuge in the countries of Europe immediately bordering upon Germany. France was at one time host to 30,000, and it is estimated that 20,000 of them have been sent on from there to other countries. In the Netherlands, 5,263 refugees were registered. Czechoslovakia also has given asylum for over 5,000 individuals. No less than 36,800 refugees had, by June 15, 1935, gone overseas—to Palestine, the United States, South America, and South Africa."[1] Ähnliche Verteilungszahlen finden wir in dem Buch von Norman Bentwich, *The Refugees from Germany* (London, 1936). In diesen Zahlen sind auch die der arischen und christlichen nichtarischen Auswanderer mitenthalten.

Die stetige Auswanderung muss natürlich die Lage der deutschen Juden aufs stärkste beeinflussen. Nach der Volkszählung vom 16. Juni 1933 betrug die Zahl der Glaubensjuden in Deutschland 499,682. Die Zahl der Glaubensjuden in Deutschland am 1. April 1936 wird vom Wanderungsausschuss der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland unter Berücksichtigung der gesamten Auswanderung seit dem 1. Februar 1933 und der natürlichen Bevölkerungsverminderung durch den Sterbeüberschuss der deutschen Juden auf 409,000 geschätzt. Dr. Ernst G. Löwenthal kommt in einer Berechnung,[2] in dem Blatt des Jüdischen Centralvereins, zu dem Schluss: "*Ende* 1936 *lebten in Deutschland etwa* 400,000 *Juden,* 1933 waren es noch annähernd 500,000 Juden." Er stützt seine Berechnungen auf die Bevölkerungsbewegung in den erinzelnen jüdischen Gemeinden, besonders den Grossgemeinden. Da der deutsche Jude auch schon vor dem Hitler-Regime zum Grosstädter geworden war, ist die nachstehende Tabelle, die Löwenthal veröffentlicht, ungemein charakteristisch. Sie wird durch die neuesten Beobachtungen bestätigt. Die noch vorhandenen 6 jüdischen Grossgemeinden in Deutsch. land zeigten folgende Entwicklung:

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[1] Publication of the League of Nations, Nr off. C.13, M.12. 1936. XII. Annex.

[2] *C.V. Zeitung*, Berlin, Nr. 14, v. 8. April 1937.

	Mitte 1933	um Ende 1936	Rückgang in %
Berlin	162,000	145,000	10
Breslau	über 20,000	über 17,000	15
Köln	15,000	14,000	7
Frankfurt a.M. ..	26,000	21,000	20
Hamburg	17,000	15,000	12
Leipzig	11,000	9,500	14

Aus dieser Tabelle zieht Löwenthal folgenden Schluss: "Die Bevölkerungsdezimierung reicht also in dieser Gemeindegrössenklasse nach oben bis zu einem Fünftel des Bestandes und sinkt nach unten sogar unter den Hundertsatz von 10. Dass die Schrumpfung in diesen Fällen verhältnismässig gering blieb, erklärt sich daraus, dass die Auswanderung ansässiger Juden durch den Zuzug jüdischer Menschen aus den Mittel- und Kleingemeinden der engeren und weiteren Umgebung zum Teil wieder wettgemacht wurde."

So sind *zahlreiche jüdische Gemeinden in Deutschland völlig verschwunden,* ihre Synagogen, oft Zeugen uralter Tradition, wurden zu profansten Zwecken verkauft, andere Gemeinden sind stark zusammengeschrumpft.

Für einzelne Gemeinden liegen auch genaue Ziffern vor, wieviele Mitglieder sie durch die Auswanderung verloren haben, und wohin diese Auswanderer gingen. So berichtet Bezirksrabbiner Dr. Ernst Jacob, Augsburg,[1] über die Auswanderung aus seiner Gemeinde. Von den 1,000 Seelen sind bereits im ganzen mehr als 300 ausgewandert. Es ist charakteristisch, dase der Hauptstrom nach den Vereinigten Staaten und Palästina ging. Über die jüdische Gemeinde Stettin liegen auch Zahlen vor.[1] Danach verminderte sich die jüdische Bevölkerung Stettins vom 1. Januar 1936 bis zum 31. Dezember 1936 um genau 217 Personen auf 1936 Mitglieder, das ist ein Verlust von 10 pro Cent. Der Auswanderungsverlust beträgt allein 6·4 pro Cent. Von den Auswanderern gingen 31·5 pro Cent nach Palästina und 27·8 pro Cent nach Amerika.

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[1] *C.V. Zeitung*, Nr. 26, v. 1. Juli 1937.

Für die Stadt *Berlin* werden in Nummer 12 der vom Berliner Statistischen Amt herausgegebenen *Berliner Wirtschaftsberichte* (Juniheft 1937) einige Zahlen über die Wanderungsbewegung der Juden veröffentlicht. Danach sind im Jahre 1936 7,127 Juden nach Berlin zugezogen und 12,094 aus Berlin abgewandert. Das wichtigste Herkunftsgebiet für die nach Berlin zugewanderten Juden war die Nachbarprovinz Brandenburg und die Grenzmark. Diese Feststellung deckt sich also mit den Beobachtungen Löwenthals. Von der Gesamtzahl aller aus Berlin abgewanderten Juden zog über die Hälfte, nämlich 7,008 oder 57·9 pro Cent ins Ausland fort. Hierzu kommen bestimmt noch zahlreiche der "auf Reisen" abgemeldeten Juden. Nach Palästina gingen 23·7, nach Amerika 23·5 pro Cent.

Der *starke Rückgang der Geburtenzahl* bei den Juden in Deutschland ist eine Folge der zunehmenden Auswanderung gerade der jüngeren Jahrgänge und der selbstverständlich verminderten Geburtenfreudigkeit der Zurückgebliebenen. Dieser Vorgang fördert natürlich ebenfalls den *rapiden Rückgang der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland.*

Fragt man also, wieviel Juden in Deutschland am Ende des Jahres 1937 noch leben, so wird man unter Berücksichtigung der Ziffer von ca. 24,000 Auswanderern und unter Einsetzung des natürlichen Bevölkerungabganges, falls man den Gesamtverlust durch Tod, Austritt und Auswanderung auf nicht mehr als 10 pro Cent schätzt, auf eine Gesamtzahl von 360,000 kommen. Seit der Volkszählung im Juni 1933 hätte sich danach also die *Zahl der deutschen Juden um fast* 30 *pro Cent verringert*, seit Beginn des Jahres 1933 bestimmt um mehr als 1/3. Man könnte also fast genau berechnen, wann der letzte Jude aus Deutschland verschwunden sein wird. Schon bis 1941 hätte sich nach Traubs Berechnungen die jüdische Bevölkerung Deutschlands um die Hälfte vermindert.

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[1] *Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt für die Synagogengemeinden in Preussen*, Nr. 9, v. 1. Sept. 1937.

Bei der Feststellung der Gesamtzahlen für die jüdische Auswanderung aus Deutschland wurden bereits die *Auswanderungsziele* berücksichtigt. Es ist natürlich von besonderem Interesse festzustellen, wohin die Auswanderer gegangen sind. Man kann ohne Zögern daraufhinweisen, dass es kaum ein Land der Erde geben dürfte, das nicht Juden aus Deutschland aufgenommen hat. Leider fehlen statistische Unterlagen, die die Verteilung der Auswanderer auf die einzelnen Staaten zeigen. Aus den Briefen der Ausgewanderten weiss man natürlich, wohin sie gezogen sind, aber diese persönlichen Dokumente genügen nicht, um zu ermitteln, wieviele jüdische Einwanderer aus Deutschland in dem betreffenden Lande sich aufhalten. Man ist bei diesen Feststellungen zum grossen Teil auf die Angaben der Hilfsorganisationen in diesen Ländern angewiesen. Da sich aber neben den unterstützten Auswandererern in jedem Lande mindestens ebensoviele niedergelassen haben, die keinerlei Unterstützung benötigen, so ist man fast überall auf Schätzungen angewiesen. Dabei muss noch der Faktor berücksichtigt werden, dass besonders *aus den Ländern Europas*, die zuerst für die deutschen Juden, die nächstgelegene Zufluchtsstätte bildeten, eine *starke Abwanderung* stattgefunden hat; besonders aus Frankreich, Holland und der Tschechoslowakei sind zahlreiche Flüchtlinge nach Palästina, Südafrika, Nord- und Südamerika weitergewandert. So verschiebt sich das Bild, das diese Auswanderung heute bietet, stark gegenüber dem des Jahres 1933.

Unter Berücksichtigung aller Unsicherheitsmomente zählt man Ende des Jahres 1937 in *England* 4,000 gegen einst 11,000 und in *Frankreich* ca. 6,000 deutsch-jüdische Einwanderer. Die Zahl wird für *Holland* auf mindestens 5,000 geschätzt. Das *Comité voor Joodsche Vluchtelingen* in Amsterdam hatte bis zum 31. Aug. 1937 7,821 Flüchtlinge registriert, von denen zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch 806 unterstützt wurden. Von diesen Flüchtlingen waren bis zum 31. Aug. 1937 4,764 weiterbefördert worden, darunter interessanterweise 1,086, die nach Deutschland zurückgekehrt waren. Gerade in Holland haben sich zahlreiche deutsche Juden in Amsterdam, den Haag, Rotterdam, Nijmegen, Groningen und anderen Städten niedergelassen, Angehörige aller sozialen Schichten, denen es zum grössten Teil möglich gewesen ist, sich allmählich in das holländische Wirtschaftsleben einzugliedern dank der entgegenkommenden Haltung der holländischen Regierung und der Behörden.

Nach Mitteilungen, die der Leiter des schwedischen Sozialamtes Bürochef Kurt Bergström[1] gemacht hat, beträgt die Zahl der deutschen Juden, die nach *Schweden* gegangen sind 600–800 Köpfe. Bergström betonte, dass ein nicht geringer Teil dieser Einwanderer die Absicht habe, weiterzuwandern. Ueber *Dänemark* sind wir durch eine Ansprache des Justizministers Steincke unterrichtet, der zu Beginn dieses Jahres die Zahl der jüdischen Einwanderer aus Deutschland mit 845 angab. Hierzu kamen noch 168 Chaluzim (eigentlich Pioniere), das sind junge Menschen, die für Palästina im Handwerk und der Landwirtschaft ausgebildet werden, also aus Dänemark weiterwandern. Ähnliche Chaluzstätten gibt es übrigens auch noch in anderen Ländern. Die bekannteste Kolonie ist wohl das Werkdorf in Wieringen im Wieringermeer Polder in Holland. In *Norwegen* ist die Zahl der deutschen Juden noch wesentlich geringer. Im ganzen sind im Laufe der letzten vier Jahre 2,000 bis 2,300 Juden nach Skandinavien ausgewandert.[2]

Von offizieller jüdischer Seite wird die Zahl der in *Österreich* lebenden deutsch-jüdischen Einwanderer mit ca. 1,500 Personen beziffert, von denen die meisten sich in Wien niedergelassen haben. Die Fürsorge-Zentrale der Israelitischen Kultusgemeinde Wien hat seit Beginn dieser Auswanderung ungefähr 3,000 Familien betreuen müssen. Hierunter befanden sich allerdings auch österreichische Juden, die aus Deutschland geflüchtet waren. Bis Mitte 1936 konnten reichsdeutsche Staatsangehörige in Österreich eine Stellung antreten. Dies ist jetzt für Juden nicht mehr möglich. Für Handwerker und für Gewerbetreibende wird ein Befähigungsnachweis verlangt, womit auch die Niederlassung von Kaufleuten und Handwerkern in Österreich sehr erschwert ist. Mitte des Jahres 1937 hielten sich in *Ungarn* 313 deutsche Juden auf, die auf Grund der Ereignisse in Deutschland dorthin ausgewandert waren.

In *Jugoslavien* gab es Ende Juni 1937 noch ungefähr 450 Juden aus Deutschland, nachdem ca. 6,500 durch dieses Land gezogen waren. Der grösste Teil dieser Auswanderer ging weiter nach Osten, besonders in den Jahren 1933 und 1934 zunächst nach Bulgarien, Rumänien und Griechenland, zum Teil auch bis Palästina. Das jüdische Hilfskomitee in Zagreb hat 128 Personen seit 1933 weiterbefördert, daneben 77 Chaluzim nach Palästina.

[1] *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm, v. 19. Feb. 1937.

[2] Vgl. auch *C.V. Zeitung*, Nr. 17, v. 29. April 1937.

Zur Zeit befinden sich 3 landwirtschaftliche Hachschara-Stätten in Jugoslavien. — Die "Selbstwehr"[1] berichtet in einem Artikel "Evakuation der Prager Emigranten" über die Lage in der *Tschechoslowakei.* Die Vorsitzende des Zentralcomités der Flüchtlingsfürsorge in der Tschechoslowakei, Frau Marie Schmolka, teilte danach mit, "dass von den seit 1933 nach der Tschechoslowakei gekommenen etwa 5,000 Flüchtlingen aus Deutschland der grösste Teil in andere Länder abgewandert ist. Nur noch etwa 20 pro Cent derselben leben in der Tschechoslowakei." Danach wären also nur noch 1,000 Auswanderer in diesem Lande.

Für die übrigen europäischen Länder war es nicht möglich, einwandfreie Zahlen der jetzt dort ansässigen deutschen Juden zu erhalten. Die Wanderung nach Polen und nach Rumänien betraf im allgemeinen wohl nur Rückwanderer, also polnische bezw. rumänische Juden, die in Deutschland ansässig waren und durch die Ereignisse veranlasst wurden, in ihre alte Heimat zurückzukehren. Aus Spanien sind durch den Bürgerkrieg viele der deutschen Juden, die sich in Madrid, Barcelona und anderswo niedergelassen hatten, wieder fortgewandert, nur ein kleiner Teil von ihnen ist im Lande geblieben. Man kann vielleicht die Anzahl der deutschen Juden, die sich in diesen Ländern, also der Schweiz, Belgien, Luxemburg, Italien, Polen, Rumänien, Griechenland, Spanien und Portugal aufhalten, auf ungefähr 8,000 schätzen.

In *Belgien* sind von dem "Comité d'aide et d'assistance" in Brüssel vom 9. April 1933 bis zum 9. April 1937 im ganzen 3,456 Personen betreut worden, von denen mit Hilfe dieses "Comités" 2,851 weiterwanderten. In *Luxemburg* haben ca. 200 jüdische Emigranten die Niederlassüngsgenehmigung erhalten. In *Italien* haben sich ca. 2,000 deutsche Juden niedergelassen.

Bei der Auswanderung nach *Palästina* spielen natürlich ideologische Gründe eine ganz besondere Rolle. Infolgedessen steht Palästina als Auswanderungszentrum für die deutschen Juden noch immer an der Spitze. Bis zum 31. März 1936 also in ungefähr drei Jahren waren dorthin 33·3 pro Cent aller deutsch-jüdischen Auswanderer gegangen. Bis Mitte 1936 waren 35,000 deutsche Juden nach Palästina ausgewandert. Von ihnen lebten in den drei Städten Tel Aviv, Haifa und Jerusalem 68·5 pro Cent, in den Kolonien und Siedlungen das restliche Drittel von 31·5 pro Cent[2]

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[1] *Jüdisches Volksblatt,* Prag, Nr. 38, v. 10. September 1937.

[2] Vgl. *C.V. Zeitung,* Nr. 6, v. 11. Feb. 1937.

Nach den Ziffern, die das statistische Departement der *Jewish Agency* veröffentlicht hat, betrug die jüdische Einwanderung nach Palästina im Jahre 1936 29,727 Köpfe. Hiervon kamen 11,588 aus Polen oder 39 pro Cent und 8,180 oder 27·3 pro Cent aus Deutschland, das damit an zweiter Stelle steht. Der deutsche Anteil an der Einwanderung hat sich seit 1935 verdoppelt. (Vgl. *The Palestine Post*, Jerusalem, 6. April, 1937.) Für Ende 1936 wird die Zahl der Juden aus Deutschland, die sich in Palästina niedergelassen haben, mit 38,500 angegeben,[1] sie dürfte bis Ende 1937 höchstens 43,000 betragen. Nach den offiziellen Angaben der Statistischen Abteilung der *Jewish Agency* betrug die deutsche Einwanderung in den ersten 7. Monaten 1937 ca. 2,200 Personen.

Für die Einwanderung deutscher Juden nach der *Südafrikanischen Union* liegt genaues Material in der Broschüre *The Immigration of Jews into the Union* (1926–35) *with Appendices for the Year* 1936, issued by the "South African Jewish Board of Deputies, Johannesburg" vor. Danach betrug die Zahl der jüdischen Einwanderer aus Deutschland dorthin 1933: 204, 1934: 452, 1935: 421 und 1936: 2,577, im ganzen also 3,554. Durch das neue Einwanderungsgesetz veröffentlicht in *The Government Gazette*, Cape Town, 18. January 1937, ist die Einwanderung nach der Union so erschwert worden, dass sie im Jahre 1937 auf ein Minimum zurückgegangen ist.

Für das übrige Afrika und Asien fehlt es an genauen Zahlen, ebenso für Australien und Neuseeland, die in der letzten Zeit das Ziel einer verstärkten Auswanderung geworden sind.

Die Auswanderung nach *Amerika* hat in der letzten Zeit stark zugenommen, besonders seitdem die Unruhen in Palästina eine Auswanderung dorthin erschwert haben. Nach den *Vereinigten Staaten* waren bis zum 1. April 1936 9,500 deutsche Juden gegangen, ihre Zahl beträgt jetzt minderstens 15,000. Nach Mitteilungen des Hilfsvereins der Juden in Deutschland hat sich 1936 die Nordamerikawanderung verdoppelt, die Südamerikawanderung vervierfacht.[2] In *Canada* zählt man ca. 400 deutsche Juden. Die Einwanderungsmöglichkeiten nach Südamerika sind in letzter Zeit auch vom "International Labour Office," Geneva eingehend untersucht worden.[3]

[1] *Jüdische Rundschau*, Berlin, Nr. 9. v. 2. Feb. 1937.

[2] Vgl. *C.V. Zeitung*, Nr. 9, v. 4. März 1937.

[3] Vgl. hierzu "The Immigration and the Colonization in Brazil, Argentinia and Uruguay," *International Labour Review*, Nr. 2/3, 1937.

Über die Einwanderung deutscher Juden nach den einzelnen südamerikanischen Staaten besitzen wir zuverlässiges Material in den Reiseberichten, die Dr. Bruno Weil veröffentlicht hat.[1] Danach zählte man bis Ende 1936 in *Brasilien* ungefähr 8,000 deutschjüdische Einwanderer, davon allein in Rio de Janeiro 3,000. In *Argentinien* waren es 10,000 Köpfe. Von ihnen sind bis zum 31. März 1937 rund 4,500 Personen vom Hilfsverein deutschsprechender Juden in Buenos Aires betreut worden. Argentinien steht an der Spitze der jüdischen Einwanderung nach Südamerika. Nach *Uruguay* betrug die jüdische Einwanderung aus Deutschland ungefähr 600 Seelen, damit sind in die drei Staaten der Ostküste Südamerikas 18,600 Juden abgewandert.

Die Auswanderung nach der Westküste Südamerikas hat erst im Jahre 1937 erheblich zugenommen. Für dieses Jahr aber liegen noch keine Zahlen vor. Nach *Chile* sind bis Ende 1936 ungefähr 2,000 deutsche Juden gegangen, nach *Bolivien* nur 20, nach *Peru* nur 150, nach *Ecuador* ungefähr 200, nach *Paraguay* ca. 300. Nach einer Mitteilung der Zeitung *La Nacion*, Asuncion, v. 26. Februar 1936 hatte Präsident Franco die Einwanderung von Juden nach Paraguay überhaupt verboten. Dagegen ist sie in der letzten Zeit nach *Venuzuela* erleichtert worden und hat besonders stark nach *Columbien* zugenommen. Sie betrug bis Ende 1936 ungefähr 250 Köpfe.

Die Gesamtzahl der 135,000 *ausgewanderten deutschen Juden verteilt sich Ende* 1937 *in ungefähr folgender Weise:* es wanderten nach den europäischen Ländern 30,000, nach Nordamerika 15,000, nach Südamerika 21,000, nach Südafrika 4,000, nach der übrigen Welt 2,000, und schliesslich nach Palästina 43,000. Dazu kommen noch die ca. 20,000 Rückwanderer, die nach Osteuropa zurückgingen.

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[1] *C.V. Zeitung*, Nr. 50, v. 10. Dezember 1936 bis Nr. 14, v. 8. April 1937.

ROBERT R. KUCZYNSKI. *Colonial Population.* Department of Social Biology, London School of Economics. Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1937.

This book, published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, appears at an opportune moment. It contains invaluable information for present-day discussion on colonial problems, not only regarding the total population of colonies, but also the distribution by race (whites, Asiatics, African, half-castes, natives, etc.) and by continent of birth. The result of this painstaking research is set out in several tables. Whereas the general tables are largely based on the *Statistical Year Book of the League of Nations*, the detailed data have been computed mostly from official documents of the respective colonies or their mother-countries. All the sources used and the comments called for by the data are set out in detail in a special appendix occupying nearly two-thirds of the book. These notes and references are evidence of the thoroughness of the work done; they will be, moreover, invaluable for reference purposes.

From the chapter on birth and death records the reader learns how very scanty and unsatisfactory is the material on this subject; some highly interesting statements on the nature of colonial "censuses" and "population estimates" contained in the Introduction will cause him to regret its brevity.

The author insists rightly on the guess-work character of so many colonial "censuses" and "estimates," which are in many cases useless for the measurement of year-to-year fluctuations of the population. The reader who is inexperienced, or has not troubled to consult the explanatory notes, may occasionally be misled by Table III, showing the population of the individual colonies for each of the years 1931 to 1935. Such a juxtaposition of data, many of which represent simply successive attempts at estimating the population, and reflect the divergencies between the various compilers, offers some pitfalls to readers possessing neither the skill nor the vast experience of the author for separating the tares from the wheat. And the author shows clearly that the field of colonial statistics is richer in tares than in wheat.

GRZEGORZ FRUMKIN.

RYOICHI ISHII. *Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan.* London: P. S. King & Son. 1937.

Whereas Japan's demographic and economic expansion are topics of world-wide interest, Western students are frequently prevented by linguistic difficulties from making adequate use of the existing rich material. Hence the difficulty in re-examining in a critical spirit the views expressed by previous authors and a tendency to repeat them. Such subsequent endorsements do not, however, in themselves add anything to their value.

Western students will be particularly indebted to the author, who puts at their disposal a mass of data, much of which has hitherto been inaccessible to them. They will pay high tribute not only to the skill with which he has covered an unusually wide field, but also to the independent and critical spirit in which his book is written, which contrasts favourably with the task performed by so many official or half-official spokesmen.

Having analysed the population trend in the past and reviewed the various forecasts of Japan's future population, the author examines the future increase in relation to economic possibilities, paying particular attention to problems of agriculture, food supply, colonization, migrations, and, finally, industrialization and birth-control. Whereas, in his opinion, agriculture is not likely to absorb any appreciable additional number of people, the quantity of food which may be produced in the Japanese Empire or territories under its direct control is believed by him to be sufficient to cover the present needs. This problem of quantity is, however, less serious than that of the necessary adjustments between the colonies and the mother-country, the cost of production being in the latter higher than in the former. The increase of population, which calls for further industrialization accompanied by an improvement in the distribution of the national income, is likely to lessen with the progress of the birth-control movement, which has the sympathy of the author.

Whereas the above views will be fully endorsed by many Westerners, one may question the view, expressed on p. 254, that in Japan the trend of population growth has followed the trend of economic development. This brings us dangerously near the popular view that the population increased in response to the widening of economic scope due to industrial progress. If this were true, it would be difficult to see how further industrialization could remedy the population pressure. There would be no escape from a vicious circle.

It would appear that the author, like so many others, has been to some extent the victim of statistical fallacies. Contrary to first appearance, some of the Japanese statistics, whether demographic, economic, or financial, are still unsatisfactory. Those which are good have become so as a result of gradual improvements. This is but natural, and statements to this effect should not be considered as adverse criticisms. On the contrary, the remarkable development of Japanese statistics should be a subject of pride to their compilers. It is regrettable that, as regards the quality of statistics, the author confines his critical remarks practically to population estimates and accepts without reservation the records of population movement. In this he agrees with the numerous other authors, both Japanese and Westerners, who, misled by deficient statistics, reached the conclusion that the striking increase of population in the second half of the nineteenth century was the more remarkable because it took place as a result of increased fertility and in spite of an increasing mortality. Hence the author's references to such remarkably low levels as 17·1 per thousand for births in 1872 and 12·2 per thousand for deaths (pp. 105, 113), or 95 per thousand for infant mortality in 1886 (p. 123).

In the opinion of the reviewer, it is not to be expected that the registration could have been, contrary to the experience of other countries, complete from the first year of its existence, i.e. 1872. This view is supported by the following official birth- and death-rates:

	Births	Deaths
1872	17·1	12·2
1873	24·1	19·6
1900	31·7	20·3

In some cases the author rejects some of the data as being unsatisfactory, but, surprisingly enough, he uses and quotes them extensively. He points out that some of the fluctuations in rates are merely due to lack of homogeneity in the population estimates used for their computation, but he makes no endeavour to put them right. He quotes birth-rates suggesting a rise from 31·6 per thousand in 1919 to 36·2 per thousand in 1920, although he knows that it was due mainly to the use in 1919 of an inflated population estimate on a *de jure* basis, whereas in 1920 a lower census figure was used. For similar reasons detailed figures for population increase since 1898 by size of communities are possibly not of much use either (p. 72, Table XX). Many other statistical data reproduced by the author are likewise of a doubtful value. To pick out one example among many, not much credit can be given to changes in occupational distribution since 1872 (p. 80, Table XXVIII) if one knows that the first Japanese census took place in 1920, and even the results of the 1920 and 1930 censuses cannot be compared with each other without material adjustments. The reader faced with such data will hardly enjoy the suggestion of the author that some questions as to possible differences in census criteria should be "left to the search of the readers" (p. 85). It is the duty of the author, not of the reader, to make such investigations.

Presented with so many statistics taken from haphazard sources, one may become *a priori* sceptical and less inclined to endorse the views of the author. The author has, moreover, made the task of the Western reader somewhat complicated by referring nearly exclusively to the works of Japanese authors written in Japanese. Several of the Japanese authors published, however, papers in Western languages, mostly English (e.g. Honjo and Horie). Similarly useful information was published by the Japanese Statistical Office in French in the annual returns of population and of population movement.

Just one example in this connection: Table II, p. 7, relating to population censuses in the Tokugawa era is stated vaguely to be based, *inter alia*, "on the population tables of Dr. Honjo. . . ." The series is found by the reviewer to be in conflict with the data submitted by Dr. Honjo in English to the Tokyo meeting of the International Institute of Statistics: Ishii's figures for 1804 and 1852 are given by Honjo as referring to 1816 and 1828 respectively.

The above few examples suggest that the work would possibly have gained by a narrowing of its scope, accompanied by a closer sifting of the statistical material.

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